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MENS REA AND INCHOATE CRIMES
LARRY ALEX&ND* KIMBERLY D. KESSLER**
I. INTRODUCTION
When a defendant engages in proscribed conduct or in conduct
that brings about a forbidden result, our interest focuses on his state
of mind at the time he engages in the proscribed conduct or the con-
duct that causes the result. We usually are unconcerned with his
state(s) of mind in the period leading up to the conduct. The narra-
tive of the crime can begin as late as the moment defendant engages
in the conduct (or, in the case of completed attempts,1 believes he is
engaging in the conduct).
Criminal codes do not restrict themselves to proscribing harmful
conduct or results, however, but also criminalize various acts that pre-
cede harmful conduct. Thus, codes punish agreeing to engage in
criminal conduct,2 soliciting such conduct,3 and taking a substantial
step toward engaging in such conduct.4 Codes also elevate the seri-
ousness of some crimes if they are committed with the purpose of
committing some further crimes. Thus, trespass or breaking and en-
tering become burglary if committed with the intention to commit
* Warren Distinguished Professor, University of San Diego School of Law.
** Law clerk to the Hon. Marvin Katz (Eastern District of Pennsylvania). We would like
to thank Kevin Cole, Steve Duke, Heidi Hurd, Leo Katz, Shaun Martin, Michael Moore,
Stephen Morse, Hans Oberdiek, Stephen Perry, Paul Robinson, Ken Simons, Daniel Ye-
ager, and the participants in the Criminal Theory Workshop at the University of Penn-
sylvania Law School.
1 A completed attempt is one in which the actor believes the harm is occurring (when
it is not) or is beyond his ability to prevent. But see infra Appendix A.
2 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03 (1985) (defining the crime of conspiracy).
3 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.02 (1985) (defining the crime of solicitation).
4 See, e.g., the following subsections of MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 (1985), which define
the crime of attempt to include various forms of "incomplete attempts," i.e., attempts that
have not yet become irrevocable by the defendant: § 5.01 (1) (c) (taking a substantial step
toward engaging in criminal conduct); § 5.01 (1) (b) (acting with the purpose or belief that
a prohibited result will occur without further conduct on the actor's part, but where the
defendant still retains the ability to prevent the result from occurring, such as where she
has lit the fuse but still believes she can snuff it out); and § 5.01(3) (acting in a way that
would make defendant an accomplice in another's crime or attempted crime were the
latter to attempt such crime).
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other crimes on the premises.5 Or simple assault can become a more
aggravated offense if committed with the intent to kill, to rape, or to
maim.
6
What mental states are required for these "inchoate crimes"-i.e.,
crimes that are preliminary to bringing about the harms that are the
criminal law's ultimate concerns? The mental states cannot be identi-
cal to those required for completed crimes and completed attempts,
for the defendant committing an inchoate crime is aware or believes
that there is still time to desist and renounce. That awareness or be-
lief is at least one qualitative distinction between the mental states of
completed and inchoate crimes.
For an inchoate crime such as conspiracy, solicitation, or incom-
plete attempt, criminal codes usually require that the defendant must
have the purpose to engage in the forbidden conduct. This require-
ment is ambiguous in two respects. First, purposes with respect to fu-
ture conduct can be conditional, unlike the purposes that accompany
completed conduct, which, however conditional they once were, be-
come unconditional at the point of decision. The conditions attached
to purposes regarding future conduct can be either internal (subjec-
tively entertained by the defendant) or external (factors that, given
defendant's dispositions, would cause him to alter his purposes once
he becomes aware of them). If some but not all conditional purposes
satisfy the purpose requirement of inchoate criminality, which do and
which do not? Orthodox doctrine conceals this difficulty.
Second, the requirement that defendant have as his purpose the
commission of future criminal conduct is ambiguous with respect to
the requisite mental states for the various elements of the future
crime. Thus, if a completed crime (or attempt) requires only negli-
gence regarding an element, or treats the element as a matter of strict
liability, what mental state does the requirement of "purpose" for in-
choate crimes entail for such an element?
These two ambiguities in the requirement of purpose for incho-
ate crimes are obviously linked whenever the defendant's purpose is
internally conditional on the nonexistence of a particular element.
Thus, if killing a cop is an aggravated murder, and the status of the
victim as a cop is a matter of strict liability, then if defendant has as his
purpose the killing of X only ifX is not a cop-and, at the moment of
the law's intervention, defendant believes X is not a cop and thus (at
that moment) intends to kill him-does defendant have the requisite
5 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1(1) (1985).
6 See, e.g., CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE § 220 (West 1997).
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purpose for inchoate criminality?7
Our plan is first to explore separately these two ambiguities in the
purpose requirement for inchoate crimes and then to explore the
linkage, if any, between them. Section II will thus address the prob-
lem of conditional purposes; Section III will address the problem of
the relation between the mens rea required for completed crimes and
attempts and the mens rea required for inchoate crimes; and Section
IV will address the linkage between these two issues.
The mens rea discussion in Sections II-IV will disclose some deep
theoretical difficulties in the justifications for having inchoate crimes.
In Section V we shall turn normative. Should we jettison inchoate
crimes from the repertoire of the criminal law? Or should we retain
inchoate crimes and reconsider the standard justifications for crimi-
nal punishment?
II. CONDITIONAL PURPOSES
A. INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY CONDITIONAL PURPOSES
Conditional purposes in a strict sense are purposes that the ac-
tor-who for our purposes will be referred to as the defendant-sub-
jectively holds to be conditional on the occurrence or nonoccurrence
of some event, including acquiring certain beliefs. We shall refer to
conditional purposes in this strict sense as internally conditional pur-
poses, because the conditions are part of defendant's own under-
standing of his mental state.8 Externally conditional purposes are
purposes that will in fact be renounced by defendant if some event
occurs but which at present are viewed by defendant as unconditional.
Some common examples of internally conditional purposes of in-
terest to the criminal law include a purpose to kill unless defendant is
allowed to escape,9 a purpose to rape unless the victim is a virgin,10
7 We do not address the problems of negligence and strict liability regarding circum-
stances in completed crimes. Whether negligence is culpable and thus merits retributive
punishment, or whether negligence and strict liability are justifiable bases for criminal
punishment for reasons of deterrence even if they do not reflect culpability, are beyond
the scope of this paper, at least insofar as completed crimes are concerned.
8 Michael Moore distinguishes two kinds of internally conditional purposes: (1) those
of the form, "D intends [A, unless C];" and (2) those of the form, "D intends [if not C, D
intends A]." Conversation with the authors (Fall 1994). The second is an intention with
respect to a future intention and the condition that will trigger it. We believe nothing of
consequence for the criminal law rides on this distinction, and so we shall ignore it.
9 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Richards, 293 N.E.2d 854 (1973) (conviction of assault
with intent to kill upheld where defendant only intended to kill if necessary for his escape).
Accord Wis. STAT. § 943.30 (West 1955); McKinnon v. United States, 644 A.2d 438 (D.C.
App. 1994); Commonwealth v. Hogg, 311 N.E.2d 63 (Mass. 1974); Thompson v. State, 36
S.W. 265 (Tex. Crim. App. 1896); State v. Dooley, 26 S.W. 558 (Mo. 1894); State v. Morgan,
25 N.C. 186 (1842). But see State v. Irwin, 285 S.E.2d 345 (N.C. 1982); State v. Kinnemore,
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and a purpose to steal unless there is no money in the house.1' In all
of these cases the defendant has as his purpose the commission of a
crime unless some condition obtains or fails to obtain. Moreover, in
none of these cases does the condition negate the criminality of the
purpose. In other words, killing is still a crime even if necessary to
effect an unlawful escape, having forcible sex is still a crime even if the
victim is not a virgin, and stealing is still a crime even if the thing
stolen is money.
All purposes to engage in future criminal conduct are externally
conditional if there are some circumstances that will cause defendant
to desist from his plan to engage in that conduct. The counterpart
externally conditional purposes to those in the above examples would
be the following: defendant's subjectively unqualified purpose to kill,
where defendant will not in fact kill if he is allowed to escape; defend-
ant's subjectively unqualified purpose to rape, where defendant will
not in fact rape if he discovers the victim is a virgin; and defendant's
subjectively unqualified purpose to steal, where defendant will not in
fact steal anything if there is no money. The criminal law assumes that
externally conditional purposes are sufficient for inchoate criminality
because in most states and under the Model Penal Code, inchoate
crimes are renounceable, and renunciation could not occur were the
original purpose not conditional on the event that triggers the renun-
ciation.12 Moreover, the criminal law is clear that internally condi-
tional purposes can be sufficient for inchoate criminality;' 3 and, given
that, it would be very strange if externally conditional purposes were
not.
The conditionality of defendant's purpose is of interest only in
295 N.E.2d 680 (Ohio. Ct. App. 1972); Craddock v. State, 37 So. 2d 778 (Miss. 1948);
Stroud v. State, 95 So. 738 (Miss. 1923).
See also People v. Connors, 97 N.E. 643 (Ii. 1912) (conviction of assault with intent to
kill upheld where defendant's condition for not killing victim was that the victim remove
his overalls); People v. Hamil, 314 N.E.2d 251 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974) (conviction for at-
tempted rape upheld where defendant told victim he would rape her unless she was a
virgin); People v. Vandelinder, 481 N.W.2d 787 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (solicitation of mur-
der conviction upheld where defendant's solicitation conditioned plot on victim's failure
to agree to unlawful demands); State v. Simonson, 214 N.W.2d 679 (Minn. 1974) (larceny
conviction upheld where defendant's purpose was to permanently deprive the owner of
the property unless he received a reward).
10 See Hami4 314 N.E.2d at 251.
11 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (b) commentary at 247 (1985); see also Harwick v. State,
49 Ark. 514 (1887) (burglary conviction sustained where defendant's purpose was to steal
the statutory minimum amount for burglary if that amount was present in the safe).
12 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 5.01 (4), 5.02(3), 5.03(6) (1985). See generally Paul 1L
Hoeber, TheAbandonment Defense to Criminal Attempt and OtherProblems of Temporal Individua-
tion, 74 CAL. L. REv. 377, 382, 421 n.180 (1986).
13 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(6) (1985).
1997] 1141
ALEXANDER & KESSLER
cases of inchoate crimes. In completed crimes14 the conditionality of
defendant's original purposes is immaterial because those purposes
have become unconditional by the time of the crime. Inchoate
crimes, however, contemplate future completed crimes, crimes that
have not yet occurred. In an inchoate crime, the defendant's purpose
is to bring about a future crime, and that purpose can be internally
and externally conditional in all sorts of ways.
B. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PURPOSES BEING INTERNALLY CONDITIONAL
What significance, if any, should attach to the fact that defend-
ant's purpose to engage in future criminal conduct is consciously con-
ditional? In the following subsections we explore the variety of
answers to this question that have been or might be proposed, begin-
ning with the Model Penal Code.
1. The Model Penal Code and the Immateriality of Conditions
The Model Penal Code, in § 2.02(6), states:
When a particular purpose is an element of an offense, such element is
established although such purpose is conditional, unless the condition
negatives the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining
the offense.15
In other words, the Model Penal Code treats conditions attached to
criminal purpose as immaterial unless they negate the criminality of
the purpose.
The Model Penal Code's answer to our question might seem radi-
cal. Consider John and Jack, who agree after buying a ticket in the
lottery that if they should win the jackpot, they will murder their wives
and spend their millions on high living. The Model Penal Code
would label this agreement a conspiracy to murder, despite the fact
that John and Jack's chance of winning is infinitesimal.
Or consider Jake, who points a loaded gun at Vickie and threat-
ens her with death unless she gives him her purse. Armed robbery,
surely. The Model Penal Code, however, would also appear to deem
this an assault with intent to kill or even an attempted murder, despite
the fact that Jake both hopes and expects Vickie will hand over the
purse. After all, under § 2.02(6), Jake's conditional purpose is to be
treated as if it were an unqualified purpose to kill Vickie.
The Model Penal Code's answer is also inconsistent with much of
14 Completed crimes for our purposes include completed attempts, those in which de-
fendant has taken the last act he believes necessary to complete the crime and in which he
believes he has lost the power to prevent the crime from occurring.
15 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(6) (1985).
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the case law. For example, in several cases involving threats to kill
made to effect escape or some other goal, courts have reversed convic-
tions of assault with intent to kill.16 Although the courts' reasoning in
these cases is less than transparent, and other courts have reached
opposite conclusions, intuitively it seems a stretch to treat these cases
as assaults with intent to kill or as attempted murder.
Why did the authors of the Model Penal Code take such an abso-
lutist position on conditional purpose? The Comments to the Code
do not disclose the underlying reasoning, but perhaps the authors saw
no way to draw lines within the class of internally conditional purposes
other than excluding those conditions that negative the criminality of
the purposes. In any event, given the extremity of the Model Penal
Code's absolutist approach and the absence of reasons offered to sup-
port it, we should examine alternatives before embracing it as the only
plausible approach to conditional purposes.
2. Remote Chances, Hopes, and the Absence of True Purpose
One possible reaction to our example of John and Jack agreeing
to kill their wives if they should win the lottery is that the extremely
low probability of the condition's being realized casts doubt on the
existence of the purpose to kill. In other words, if a purpose is condi-
tional on an event or fact that defendant realizes is highly improbable,
we can reasonably doubt that his conditional purpose is really a pur-
pose at all, as opposed perhaps to an idle fantasy.17 What we really
intend to do in circumstances that are quite unlikely to occur may be
opaque to us, even if we think we know. After. all, our awareness of
the improbability of the event disengages us from serious considera-
tion of what we would do were it to occur. Two billionaires who agree
that they will turn to a life of robbing banks if they should ever find
themselves destitute cannot really know that they intend to do so and
thus cannot really at present intend to do so.
The improbability of triggering conditions thus can serve as an
.epistemic ground for skepticism about the existence of a conditional
purpose. This use of improbability is not inconsistent with the Model
Penal Code's absolutist position since it does not require any particu-
lar probability for criminal liability but rather uses the probability of a
16 See, e.g., Craddock v. State, 37 So. 2d 778 (Miss. 1948); Stroud v. State, 95 So. 723
(Miss. 1923); State v. Irwin, 285 S.E.2d 345 (N.C. 1982); State v. Kinnemore, 295 N.E.2d
680 (Ohio Ct. App. 1972).
17 Consider the following statement "Furthermore, isn't the series-fantasying, wish-
ing, desiring, wanting, intending-a continuum, making it a rather hazy matter to know
just when a person is intending rather than wishing?" Gerald Dworkin & David Blumen-
feld, Punishment for Intentions, 75 MiND 396, 401 (1966).
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condition only as it bears on the seriousness or reality of the criminal
purpose.
Nor could the improbability of a condition conclusively negate a
criminal purpose. For suppose, in addition to John and Jack's agree-
ing that they will kill their wives if they hit the jackpot, we find that
they have bought guns and ammunition and tickets to Rio for them-
selves and their girlfriends for the day after the jackpot winner is an-
nounced. We might then conclude that they do have a serious
conditional purpose to kill their wives despite the improbability of the
condition's being realized.
The epistemic role that a condition can serve in distinguishing
real purposes from mere fantasies is a function, not only of the
probability of the condition's obtaining, but also of the nature and
strength of the defendant's desires with respect to its obtaining. Thus,
in the case of our armed robber, Jake, who threatens Vickie with
death unless she hands over her purse, we might doubt that he does
have the conditional purpose of killing her if his desire that she hand
over her purse so dominates his desire to kill that we believe he is
bluffing.
Again, however, there will be some cases like Jake's in which we
can infer a conditional purpose to kill in addition to those cases in
which we infer only a bluff. And in the former cases we are back
where we started. If we believe the Model Penal Code's absolutist ap-
proach to conditional purposes, even as qualified by allowing
probabilities and hopes to bear on proof of purpose, is still too ex-
treme, then we must look at other options.
3. Intending the Improbable
Another possible reaction to our example ofJohn andJack agree-
ing to kill their wives if they should win the lottery is that improbabil-
ity negates purpose in a stronger sense than the epistemic sense we
examined in the previous subsection. In other words, one might ar-
gue not just that improbability suggests a fantasy rather than a pur-
pose, but that as a conceptual matter, one cannot intend the
improbable.
First, let us be clear that the notion of improbability at work both
in this argument and in our examples is an epistemic one. That is, we
are assessing the probability of an event from some finite person's
point of view, not from the God's-eye view, where the "probabilities"
of all events are either one or zero. And the person whose point of
view we are interested in is the defendant, for it is his estimate of the
probability of the triggering condition that bears on whether he can
[Vol. 871144
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be said to intend the consequent.
Now, is it true thatJohn andJack cannot as a conceptual matter
have killing their wives as their purpose if they believe their chance of
winning the jackpot is infinitesimal? We think it is not true. Or, put
positively, we think that the concept of purpose extends to purposes
conditional on improbable events.
Consider the Cowardly Jackal, who, like the Jackal in Forsyth's
page-turner,' 8 agrees with the O.A.S. that he will attempt to assassi-
nate De Gaulle. He will get some money for the attempt and a good
deal more if he succeeds, so he very much wants to succeed. Unlike
Forsyth'sJackal, however, CowardlyJackal ranks not getting caught far
ahead of getting the bonus for succeeding. He therefore decides to
shoot at De Gaulle from the Eiffel Tower, where his chances of getting
caught are quite low, but where so too are his chances of killing De
Gaulle. Let us assume the latter are one-in-a-million, or at least that is
what Cowardly Jackal takes them to be.
Now suppose CowardlyJackal takes his one-in-a-million-shot at De
Gaulle and actually hits and kills him. He escapes, goes gleefully to
O.A.S. headquarters to pick up his bonus, and after doing so is turned
in by an informant. He is charged with purposeful homicide. Can he
legitimately claim that he lacked the purpose to kill because he
thought his odds of success were quite low? Of course not.
Now suppose CowardlyJackal misses De Gaulle. If he would have
been guilty of purposeful homicide had he succeeded, then it seems
correct to say that he is guilty of attempted homicide. His "purpose" is
identical to his purpose in the example in which he succeeds in killing
De Gaulle.
Of course, in these two examples, we are dealing with a remote
possibility that Cowardly Jackal will achieve the object of his act, not
with a remote possibility that he will act. So let us alter the examples
somewhat and replace Cowardly Jackal with Superstitious Jackal. Su-
perstitious Jackal is a better shot than Cowardly Jackal-his odds of
killing DeGaulle from the Eiffel Tower are, he estimates, one in half a
million, not the one in a million odds facing CowardlyJackal-but he
believes that he will not escape detection if the Fates are against him,
which they are half the time. He can tell when the Fates are against
him if he fails to call a coin flip correctly. So before he proceeds to
climb the Eiffel Tower and shoot, he intends to flip a coin and to
continue only if he calls it correctly.
Now before he flips the coin, Superstitious Jackal believes that
there is a one-in-a-million chance he will kill De Gaulle-a chance of
18 JOHN FoRS=rl, THE DAY OF THE JACKAL (1971).
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0.000002 that his bullet will kill if he fires, multiplied by a chance of
0.5 that he will fire. His hope is that he will kill De Gaulle, for then he
gets a sizable reward. Is it incorrect to say that he intends to kill De
Gaulle at this point in time?
Surely not. Or at least, surely not if we wish to allow for the possi-
bility of any conditional purposes. After all, in the garden variety and
apparently unproblematic case of conditional purpose-the defend-
ant agrees to rob the bank tomorrow if he does not come into riches
tonight and if the bank is not impregnable-we have probabilities
upon probabilities.
So let us alter the case slightly so that it becomes the case of Bold-
Superstitious Jackal. Bold-Superstitious Jackal's plan is to detonate by
remote control an atomic device in Paris, one that will almost surely
kill De Gaulle. However, Bold-Superstitious Jackal will only proceed
with this plan if he receives a signal from the Fates, namely, if a certain
string of six numbers are drawn in the French lottery, the odds of
which are one in a million. Again, he wants to kill De Gaulle to get
the reward; and again, he realizes the odds he will succeed are one in
a million. Is his purpose to kill De Gaulle?
It is difficult to see how the answer in this case could differ from
the answer in the preceding one. The overall odds as estimated by the
defendant are the same. The defendant's hopes are the same. We
conclude that the improbability of the condition does not render a
conditional purpose conceptually impossible. 19
4. Hope and Regret
Our example of Jake pointing a gun at Vickie and demanding
her purse suggests another tack for limiting inchoate criminal liability
based on the conditionality of the criminal purpose. Recall thatJake
not only expects that his condition for not killing Vickie will be met,
but also hopes that it will be met. That is, he would rather take Vickie's
purse than take her life. Perhaps we should say, as some courts have
19 We also believe that any attempt to stipulate a threshold level of probability-as esti-
mated by the defendant-below which the defendant will be deemed to lack purpose
would be misguided. For example, compare Jim, who enters Vanessa's house intending to
kill her if she is there, which he hopes is the case, but which he believes is 0.49 probable,
with Jason, who enters Vern's house intending to kill Vanessa if she is there with Vern,
which he hopes is not the case, but which he believes is 0.51 probable. If we set the stipu-
lated probability at 0.5, then Jason has entered with the intent to kill, butJim has not. Yet
distinguishing them this way seems quite counter-intuitive.
For a recent expression of the contrary position, namely, that a threshold probability
of 0.5 should be a requirement for finding purpose, see Neal Kumar Katyal, Thw Probable
Failure of Conditional Purpose, 32 GRIM. L. BULL. 25 (1996).
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said,20 thatJake does not have the purpose to kill Vickie because of his
hope that she will comply with his condition for not killing her.
Notice that this argument does not turn on any doubt about what
Jake intends if Vickie does not comply. We are assuming that he does
seriously intend to kill her in that event. However, he would rather
get her purse without killing her. The argument is that his condi-
tional purpose to kill should not be deemed the purpose to kill neces-
sary for inchoate criminality if whatJake hopes-as opposed to what he
expects or stands ready to bring about-is that the condition for kill-
ing will not be triggered.
It should be easy to see that, despite what appears to be at least
modest case support, this argument is unsatisfactory. To begin with,
in many, perhaps even most, instances of completed crimes or at-
tempts, the criminal may have hoped that he could have achieved his
ends legally or through a lesser crime, and he may truly regret that
such options were not available. Yet, we deem his crimes to have been
committed purposely despite those hopes and regrets. Why then
should the inchoate crimes with conditional purposes be treated
differently?
Second, ifJake expects Vickie to resist, though he hopes she does
not, this approach would dictate that he be acquitted of assault with
intent to kill, but that John and Jack, who hope but do not expect to
win the lottery, be convicted of conspiracy to murder. This difference
in results, if not completely counter-intuitive, is at least sufficiently in
tension with intuition to suggest that hopes cannot play the central
role this argument would have them play.
21
5. Dangerousness
Perhaps what we should be seeking within the class of defendants
with conditional purposes are those defendants whose conditional
purposes mark them as "dangerous." For example, if John and Jack
are unlikely to win the lottery and thus unlikely to kill their wives, but
Jake is likely to be resisted by Vickie, whom he will then have to kill,
then criminal liability should attach to Jake's but not to John and
Jack's conditional purpose.
Notice that the argument based on dangerousness is different
20 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
21 Moreover, it will probably also be the case that hope is much too strong a criterion
for distinguishing among conditional purposes. MostJohns and Jacks probably also hope
that if they do win the lottery, their wives will die without their having to kill them. Put




from the argument-which we have already rejected 22-that as a con-
ceptual matter, one cannot intend the improbable. Here, the argu-
ment is that although one can have such a purpose, it may render one
sufficiently harmless to preclude criminal punishment.23
The most straightforward application of this argument would
look at the probability of the triggering or defeating condition's ob-
taining and gauge dangerousness on that basis alone. However, there
are two possible ways of assigning a probability to the condition, and
each runs into difficulties.
First, assume that the relevant probability is the subjective
probability that defendant himself assigns to the condition's ob-
taining. Thus, suppose defendant intends to rape the mystery woman,
X, who has just walked into the bar, but if and only if X is Margaret
Thatcher. And suppose defendant believes-at the point when he is
arrested for an inchoate crime 24-that the chance that X is Margaret
Thatcher is one-in-three. We would then decide whether a one-in-
three chance of the triggering condition's obtaining renders defend-
ant sufficiently dangerous to justify inchoate criminal liability.
There are several problems with the subjective probability ap-
proach to dangerousness. Least important is the problem of choosing
the threshold probability that makes a conditional purpose "danger-
ous." Any such threshold will be arbitrary; but if that were all that
were problematic, perhaps such a threshold would be serviceable.
A more serious problem is the fact that the defendant's estimate
of the probability has really nothing to do with how dangerous he is in
fact. The probability that he estimates to be low may in fact turn out
to be a probability of one; the probability that he estimates to be high
may in fact turn out to be a probability of zero. If he truly possesses a
firm intention to act if the condition obtains and to refrain from act-
ing if it does not, then whether he is dangerous is more a function of
how the world is and less a function of his current beliefs about the
world.
Finally, a threshold test geared to defendant's estimate of the
probability of the condition's obtaining produces anomalous results.
If Cowardly Jackal kills DeGaulle from the Eiffel Tower, he has pur-
posely killed DeGaulle even if before he shot he estimated his chances
at one-in-a-million. If he fires and misses, this should count as a com-
22 See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing "Intending the Improbable").
23 Cf MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.05(2) (1985) (allowing mitigation where the defendant's
attempt is inherently impossible).
24 Perhaps defendant has agreed with an undercover cop that he will rape X, so that
the charge is conspiracy to rape. Or perhaps he has taken some substantial steps toward
raping X, such as obtaining a rope to bind her, so that the charge is attempted rape.
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pleted attempt since all that distinguishes this case from the previous
one is the result. In this case, however, Cowardly Jackal is no more
dangerous than Bold-Superstitious Jackal, who planned to proceed
with a foolproof method of killing DeGaulle if a one-in-a-million
string of numbers is drawn in the lottery. Yet, presumably Bold-Super-
stitious Jackal does not estimate the probability of the condition's ob-
taining to be high enough for us to deem him to be criminally liable
on this approach.
The subjective approach to assessing dangerous conditional pur-
poses appears unpromising. Therefore, it is worthwhile to discuss
whether there is an objective alternative available.
The difficulty with an objective approach lies in assessing the "ob-
jective" probability that the condition will obtain. Probability is best
thought of as an epistemic motion. From a God's-eye point of view,
the probability of any event in all its particularity is either one or zero.
In our rape example, if X is not Margaret Thatcher, then the God's-
eye probability of her being so is zero. For limited human observers,
however, probabilities are relative to some vantage point, some stock
of information (and lack of other information). If X looks like Dolly
Parton, then it may appear quite improbable to those in the bar with
defendant that X is in fact Margaret Thatcher. But if X is Margaret
Thatcher and has been dressed up by her maid to look like Dolly Par-
ton, then to the maid it will appear almost certain that X is Margaret
Thatcher.
If we want to say that conditional purposes may suffice for incho-
ate criminality if the conditions are not too improbable, whatever too
improbable means, then from what vantage point do we assess the
probability of the condition? Is it enough that X is not Margaret
Thatcher? What if she is, but it is unlikely (from what perspective?)
that she would be? What if she is, but it is unlikely that defendant will
believe she is, or, conversely, she is not, but it is unlikely that defend-
ant will believe she is not? What courses of action prior to defendant's
consummating a completed attempted rape are we predicting defend-
ant, X, and others will take?
Perhaps all these permutations can be dealt with in one fell
swoop by assuming that the only material probability is the probability
that, without intervention, the crime will be completed. Thus, given
what we know about defendant, X, and others, how likely is it that
defendant will commit a completed crime? If we can specify the point
at which the probability is high enough, we will then be able to distin-
guish inchoate crimes from noncriminal acts in cases of internally
conditional purposes. The vantage point for assessing probabilities




This approach takes us from a theoretical frying pan and places
us within a theoretical conflagration. Our focus has shifted from de-
fendant's state of mind-his conditional purpose-to defendant's
dangerousness, a matter regarding which his state of mind is only one
of many relevant factors. Why should we cull out from among all who
are dangerous only those with certain intentions? Put differently, if D1
is overall more dangerous than D2, but D2 has a conditional criminal
purpose and D1 currently has no criminal purpose, why should the
criminal law restrict its reach to D2? For example, if based on our
assessments of his character and our knowledge of the world, we can
predict that DI, who has no present purpose to rape X, will in fact do
so (if we do not intervene), why should we distinguish D1 from the
equally but no more dangerous D2, who has an internally conditional
purpose to rape X?
More importantly, if dangerousness is our quarry, why should we
acquit D1 because he presently lacks a criminal purpose, but convict D3 ,
who we predict will not rape X but who has a present internally uncon-
ditional but externally conditional purpose to rape X? From the
standpoint of dangerousness, neither the distinction between inter-
nally conditional and internally-unconditional-but-externally-condi-
tional purposes, nor the distinction between defendants with present
criminal purposes and those without present criminal purposes, is
material.
Finally, not only does objective dangerousness bear only a contin-
gent relation to the presence and internal conditionality of criminal
purpose at the time of intervention, but it is also a function of whether
and how we choose to intervene. Suppose we predict a defendant will
have sex with Lolita, who.is underage, unless he discovers and/or
comes to believe that she is underage. If he has sex with her, and the
jurisdiction makes her being underage a matter of strict liability, de-
fendant will have committed statutory rape.
Imagine now that defendant has not yet had sex with Lolita, but
he has gone far enough in that direction in terms of actus reus for
inchoate criminal liability. Suppose, for example, he is in the bed-
room with her, and they are both undressed. Now imagine in addi-
tion three possible states of mind defendant might possess. First,
assume that he has not yet formed the intent to have sexual inter-
course with her, but that when he perceives her naked beauty in the
next moment, he will, and the intent will be internally unconditional.
Second, assume that he currently has the purpose to have intercourse
with her, but only if she is over the age of consent. Third, assume that
he has an internally unconditional purpose to have intercourse, but
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the purpose is externally conditional on her being over the age of
consent. That is, if defendant comes to believe she is underage, he
will cease having the purpose to have sexual intercourse with her.
Now suppose we could shout into the bedroom and inform de-
fendant of Lolita's age. And suppose defendant would believe us. If
defendant had the first state of mind, he still might not desist. Yet
because he does not yet have the purpose to engage in intercourse,
he, though dangerous, has committed no crime.
If defendant had the second or third state of mind, however, his
dangerousness in terms of the likelihood that he would commit a
crime would be a function of our act of intervening. And if by inter-
vening we make the crime unlikely to occur, then in what sense was
the defendant "dangerous" in any way that distinguishes him from the
rest of humanity and which points to his unique suitability for crimi-
nal punishment? Moreover, if dangerousness is our concern, on what
possible basis can we distinguish the internally conditional purpose
from the purpose that is internally unconditional but externally
conditional?
Dangerousness, then, is a function of many things, and posses-
sion of a criminal purpose and whether that purpose is internally con-
ditional are neither necessary nor sufficient for dangerousness.
Moreover, objective dangerousness is a function of whether, when,
'and how we choose to intervene. In a very real sense, no defendant
charged with an inchoate crime is ever dangerous, for his arrest has made the
intended crime unlikely or impossible. Thus, dangerousnesi will not help
us distinguish among internally conditional purposes.
6. Culpability
The last possibility for distinguishing among internally condi-
tional purposes might be in terms of the relative degree of culpability
they evidence. Perhaps, for example, purposes to commit crimes that
are internally conditional on events or circumstances that are highly
improbable reflect less culpability than purposes conditional on
highly probable events or circumstances. 25
The problem is, that culpability does not seem to turn either on
the probability of the condition or on whether the purpose is inter-
nally conditional. Normally, we assess defendant's culpability in the
context of his having attempted to produce a prohibited state of af-
fairs. The defendant has knowingly taken what he has estimated to be
25 The relevant probabilities here will have to be defendants' subjective estimates. Ob-
jective probabilities are either one or zero; and others' subjective estimates do not' bear
logically on the culpability of criminal defendants.
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a particular risk that, without further action on his part, the prohib-
ited state of affairs will occur. In other words, he has subjectively cre-
ated and relinquished control over a certain level of risk.
Additionally, he has acted with a particular attitude regarding whether
the risk's eventuating would be desirable or undesirable. These fac-
tors-and others having to do with why he was willing to unleash such
a threat-go into our assessment of his culpability.
In the context of inchoate crimes, however-at least those con-
templating his future acts-the defendant has not unleashed the risk.
He still believes that he retains full control over whether the risk will
be created. All we have in terms of culpability is his present attitude
toward the prohibited harm, as reflected both in his mens rea and in
the preliminary acts that he has taken. He is culpable, not for what he
has done, but for his attitudes about what he may do.
If this is so, then it seems artificial to distinguish between inter-
nally conditional purposes and externally conditional ones. The de-
fendant who does not believe he will desist were a certain condition to
obtain-but who in fact will-seems no more culpable than one
whose subjective intent is explicitly conditional. Also he seems less
culpable than the latter in cases where we have good reason to believe
the latter will ignore the condition when it occurs and persist in his
criminal undertaking. The conditions that will affect our purposes
are never fully transparent to us until they obtain.
Nor does the defendant's subjective estimate of an internal condi-
tion's probability affect his culpability in any way that correlates
straightforwardly with the magnitude of that probability. We may,
with justification, deem John and Jack more culpable than Jake, even
though the former estimate a lower probability of killing their wives
than the probability the latter estimates of killing Vickie.
7. The Immateriality of the Distinction Between Internally and Externally
Conditional Purposes: Is The Model Penal Code Correct?
The Model Penal Code does not distinguish between defendants
whose purposes are externally conditional and those whose purposes
are internally conditional. 26 Nor does it distinguish among defend-
ants within the class of those with internally conditional purposes.
27
Our examination of alternative approaches has failed to uncover one
whose applications match our intuitions. It has instead confirmed the
Model Penal Code's implicit assumption that nothing relevant to
26 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(6) (1985).
27 See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing "The Model Penal Code and the Immateriality of
Conditions").
1152 [Vol. 87
MENS REA & INCHOATE CRJMES
criminal liability tracks either the distinction between internally and
externally conditional purposes or the distinction among internally
conditional purposes based on probability estimates, hopes, danger-
ousness, or culpability.
We should say a bit more about the first distinction-between in-
ternally and externally conditional purposes-and why we believe the
Model Penal Code is correct not to distinguish the two. Externally
conditional purposes are simply those purposes that are subjectively
unconditional-the defendant is not adverting to any circumstances
or events that will bring about his renunciation of the purpose-but
that will in fact be renounced if various circumstances obtain or events
occur. Once we accept that as a conceptual matter, one can have a
purpose conditional on something that one believes is improbable, 28
then the equation of internally and externally conditional purposes is
easy. Nothing that conceivably bears on criminal liability tracks the
distinction between internally and externally conditional purposes.
Neither culpable character traits nor dangerousness tracks the distinc-
tion. And eliminating internally conditional purposes as grounds for
criminal liability would make convictions for inchoate crimes virtually
impossible: all the defendant would need to do would be to create a
reasonable doubt that his purpose was internally unconditional.
Therefore, the Model Penal Code seems correct to treat (inter-
nally) conditional purposes as "purposes." Yet, we looked at alterna-
tives to the Model Penal Code because the Model Penal Code
criminalizes acts that intuitively seem unsuitable for criminal liability,
and it classifies many criminal acts as more serious than they appear to
be. If the problem, however, is neither the Model Penal Code's equa-
tion of conditional and unconditional purposes nor its failure to dis-
tinguish within the class of conditional purposes, perhaps the
problem is more fundamental than a problem of not distinguishing
among purposes. Perhaps the problem is instead with the very idea of
inchoate criminality.
C. RECONSIDERING INCHOATE CRIMINALITY THROUGH THE PRISM OF
PURPOSE
Thus far we have focused primarily on distinctions among condi-
tional purposes and between (internally) conditional and uncondi-
tional (externally conditional) purposes. There is, however, another
distinction worth examining, one that surfaced in our discussion of
dangerousness, and that is the distinction between those who have a
current purpose to commit a crime and those who do not. Inchoate
28 See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing "Intending the Improbable").
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criminality turns on that distinction, yet that distinction cannot bear
such weight.
Whatever purposes suffice for inchoate criminality, the law as-
sumes that such purposes are renounceable. 29 Therefore, if a defend-
ant currently has a purpose to commit a future crime, then whether or
not that purpose is internally conditional, the law assumes that its be-
ing conditional does not affect criminal liability, for the law assumes
that something may arise before the crime is consummated that will
lead defendant to renounce the purpose and desist.
Let us then compare two defendants. One has as his purpose the
murder of his wife and has taken sufficient steps toward that end to be
guilty of an inchoate crime.30 Yet an ideal observer, with knowledge
of defendant's character and all other relevant facts, can correctly pre-
dict that if defendant is not arrested now, but is allowed to proceed,
he will encounter his parish priest, with the result that he will have a
change of heart and renounce his criminal purpose.
The other defendant currently has no criminal purpose. How-
ever, our hypothetical ideal observer can predict that in the near fu-
ture, after having watched a lurid movie, defendant will form the
intention to kill his wife, take substantial steps in that direction, and,
unless stopped, do so.
The first defendant, if arrested now, is guilty of an inchoate
crime, even though he will not commit a completed crime if left
alone. He has the mens rea of purpose and has committed the actus
reus of either conspiracy or attempt. The second defendant is not
guilty of an inchoate crime even though he will commit a completed
one if left alone. Even if he otherwise satisfies the actus reus require-
ment-say, he has bought the gun with which he will eventually kill
his wife, although at the time the purchase was for an innocent rea-
son-he has not acted with the required mens rea of purpose.
What is the justification for holding the first defendant criminally
liable but not the second? The second is more dangerous. And it is
difficult to maintain that the first is more culpable, at least if the con-
nection between mens rea and culpability is that culpability is the de-
gree to which certain blameworthy defects of character are revealed
by a particular act, and mens rea is evidence of culpability.
The truth is that so long as the criminal law's requirement of pur-
pose for inchoate criminality is satisfied by a purpose that is renounce-
29 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 5.01(4) (renunciation of attempt), 5.02(3) (renunci-
ation of solicitation), 5.03(6) (renunciation of conspiracy) (1985). See also Hoeber, supra
note 12, at 382, 421 n.180.
30 Assume he has agreed with another to kill his wife (conspiracy), or has taken sub-
stantial steps toward killing her himself (attempt).
1154 [Vol. 87
MENS REA & INCHOATE CRIMES
able, then it is difficult to understand how purpose can be a necessary
condition for criminality. If Daniel, undressed and about to enter
Lolita's bedroom, does not presently have a criminal purpose-say, to
have sex with underage Lolita-but we can predict with great confi-
dence that he will have such a purpose when he sees her undressed,
then why is he now innocent of any crime when David, whose current
purpose is to have sex with Lolita, but who will renounce that purpose
when he learns her age, is guilty of attempted statutory rape?3 '
If one accepts that inchoate criminality is most plausibly pre-
mised either on dangerousness or on general wickedness of character
rather than on the commission of culpable acts,3 2 then the role of
purpose looks to be merely evidentiary. For purpose, whether inter-
nally conditional or not, is neither necessary nor sufficient for danger-
ousness or bad character. And if inchoate criminality is premised on
either dangerousness or wickedness of character, and not on culpable
acts, then it is in tension with the presumption that defendants freely
choose whether they will act dangerously and wickedly. Until the de-
fendant completes an attempt, he is just at one end of a continuum
with others who harbor culpable intentions and dangerous beliefs.
Until he takes what he believes to be the last step necessary to cause
the social harm, he can always reconsider. Whether he will or not-
which, together with the probability of other harm-negating events, is
the determinant of how dangerous he currently is-is, we presume, a
matter over which he has free choice.
There is surely an uneasy tension between treating him legally as
if he possesses free choice and is the author of his destiny, criminal or
otherwise, and treating him legally as if his future choices are predict-
able. Free choice is a bedrock assumption of liberal theories of crimi-
nal law. Predictable choice seems to be the bedrock assumption of
inchoate criminality.33 For if it is not, all that is left as a candidate is a
wicked state of mind, something that can be quite remote from the
socially harmful act to which it is directed and which makes it wicked.
31 It is true, of course, that Daniel will come within the net of inchoate criminal liability
at a later point in time barring unforeseen events that prevent his going into Lolita's bed-
room or that affect his sexual desires. Nonetheless, in terms of dangerousness and wicked-
ness of character, Daniel may presently surpass David. Moreover, there may be reasons
why we can intervene now, before Daniel forms the criminal purpose and commits the
actus reus of an inchoate crime, and not later, between the time he commits the inchoate
crime and the time he consummates it.
32 See infra Part V (where we examine whether inchoate criminality is premised on cul-
pable acts).
33 See infra note 72 (where we note the relation between inchoate criminality and pre-
ventive detention based on dangerousness).
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D. A NOTE ON SOLICITATION, COMPLICITY, AND INCHOATENESS
We should say a brief word about when solicitation and complic-
ity raise the problem of conditional purpose we have associated with
inchoate crimes and when they do not. In both crimes, the principal
who will carry out the target crime is someone other than the defend-
ant. Therefore, when and why is defendant's conditional purpose a
problem?
The answer is that defendant's conditional purpose is a problem
as long as he is capable of withdrawing his encouragement or aid and
effectively leaving the principal in a condition comparable to one in
which he had never been solicited, encouraged, or aided by defend-
ant. Until that point, solicitation and complicity remain inchoate for
our purposes here.
There is one further complication. In many cases, defendant will
not have complete control over whether he can withdraw his support
from the criminal enterprise. Therefore, he is not in an exactly paral-
lel position to the defendant who is planning to commit a crime him-
self but who can always prevent the crime by changing his mind.
Encouragement of another always creates a risk that one will fail in an
attempt to withdraw one's support, or that one will be rendered inca-
pable of withdrawing support. There is no analogue to this problem
when dealing with incomplete attempts or bare conspiracies.
34
E. CONDITIONAL PURPOSES AND INCHOATE CRIMINALTY: SOME INITIAL
CONCLUSIONS
What have we shown in our examination of conditional pur-
poses? First, we have shown that in some cases where conditional pur-
poses are present and the Model Penal Code would dictate criminal
liability, imposing such liability seems quite problematic. Second, we
have shown that in determining criminal liability, conditional pur-
poses cannot be distinguished on the basis of such facts as probability,
hope, dangerousness, or wickedness. Third, we have shown that the
Model Penal Code is correct, not only in not distinguishing among
conditional purposes on those bases, but also in not distinguishing
between conditional purposes and unconditional (externally condi-
tional) purposes. Finally, we have shown that if inchoate criminality
rests, not on the commission of culpable acts, but on dangerousness
or wickedness, then purpose of any kind should neither be necessary
nor sufficient for criminal liability.
We have raised problems with inchoate criminality through its
34 But see Larry Alexander, Crime and Culpabili,, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 29 n.93
(1994).
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purpose requirement and the ability of conditional purposes to satisfy
that requirement. It is time to turn our attention to another set of
problems with inchoate criminality, those raised by strict liability and
negligence elements of completed crimes.
III. INCHOATE CRIMES AND MENS REA AS TO CIRCUMSTANCES
There is an ongoing controversy in the criminal law over the mens
rea required for inchoate crimes. Although almost all criminal codes
require that the defendant act with the purpose that some future
crime be committed, the scope of this purpose requirement is what is
controversial. The controversy can best be illustrated through
examples.
A. THE ELEMENT IN QUESTION IS A CIRCUMSTANCE AND IS A MATTER
OF STRICT LIABILITY FOR THE COMPLETED CRIME
1. The Problem
Assume that the crime in question is assaulting a federal officer,
and the federal law makes the status of the victim (as a federal officer)
a matter of strict liability. In other words, if one carries out an assault
on someone who is in fact a federal officer, he is guilty of the federal
crime even if he did not know or have reason to know (was nonnegli-
gent in not knowing) that the victim was a federal officer. Or, to re-
turn to the statutory rape examples of the previous Section, assume
that sexual intercourse with a girl under 18 years of age is a crime
even if defendant nonnegligently believes the girl is over 18. Finally,
assume that driving a vehicle with an expired registration is a crime
irrespective, of the driver's purpose, beliefs, or reasonableness.
These examples of strict liability elements and strict liability
crimes are, of course, problematic even when we are dealing with
completed crimes. Many believe strict liability elements and crimes
unjustifiably sacrifice nonculpable or less culpable defendants at the
altar of social welfare. But however much strict liability in criminal law
may be normatively problematic, there is nothing conceptually prob-
lematic about it.
Once we turn from completed crimes, including completed at-
tempts, to inchoate crimes, things get murkier. To demonstrate this,
let us take four types of inchoate criminality and apply them to the
three crimes-assault on a federal officer, statutory rape, and driving





(1) DI and D 2 agree that they will assault V, who they do not know
or have reason to know is a federal officer.
(2) D, and D 2 agree that they will have sexual intercourse with V,
who they do not know or have reason to know is under 18.
(3) D1 and D 2 agree that D1 will drive his car to the store. Neither
knows or has reason to know that DI's car registration has expired.
b. Incomplete Attempt
(1) D1 buys a blackjack and lies in wait with the purpose of as-
saulting V, who D, does not know or have reason to know is a federal
officer.
(2) D1 entices Lolita, who he does not know or have reason to
know is under 18, into a motel room with the purpose of having sex-
ual intercourse.
(3) D1 takes out his car keys and opens his car door with the pur-
pose of driving his car. He neither knows nor has reason to know his
car's registration has expired.
c. Solicitation
(1) D1 encourages D 2 to assault V, who D, does not know or have
reason to know is a federal officer.
(2) D, encourages D 2 to have sexual intercourse with Lolita, who
D1 does not know or have reason to know is under 18.
(3) D, encourages D 2 to drive D 2's car to the store. D1 neither
knows nor has reason to know that D 2's car registration has expired.
d. Complicity
(1) D, gives D 2 a set of brass knuckles with the purpose of having
D2 assault V, who D1 does not know or have reason to know is a federal
officer.
(2) D1 gives D2 keys to a motel room with the purpose of having
D2 seduce Lolita, who D1 does not know or have reason to know is
under 18.
(3) D1 gives D 2'S car a jump start with the purpose of having D 2
drive to the store. D1 neither knows nor has reason to know D2's car
registration has expired.
3. Analysis of the Examples
All of the examples raise the same issue: Should elements that
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are matters of strict liability for completed crimes also be matters of
strict liability for inchoate crimes (or for accomplice liability for a
completed crime), so that the mere existence of the element is suffi-
cient for conviction of the inchoate crime? (For purposes of analyz-
ing this issue, one must assume that strict liability elements can be
justified for completed crimes.)
a. The Model Penal Code's Approach
The approach of the Model Penal Code to attempt liability is to
require defendant to have as his purpose the commission of conduct
that will in fact be the actus reus of a crime-or, if the crime is a result
crime, to have as his purpose the bringing about of the forbidden
result (or to believe the forbidden result will occur as a consequence
of the conduct) -but then to let the mens rea for all other elements be
identical to the mens rea required for the completed crime.3 5 D1
would satisfy the requirements for liability in all of the examples since
his purpose in all of them is either to commit the actus reus-assault-
ing V, having sex with Lolita, or driving the car-or to have D2 commit
the actus reus. However, the Code, while it does not reject the ap-
35 With respect to attempts, the Model Penal Code requires that defendant act "with
the kind of culpability otherwise required for commission of the crime." MODEL PENAL
CODE § 5.01 (1985). The Comment on this section' makes it clear that the mens rea for
circumstances-every element other than the conduct that is the actus reus-is governed
by the target crime's mens rea requirements. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 Commentary at
301-03 (1985).
Notice that following the Model Penal Code's approach to its logical extreme results
in absurd results for strict liability cases. For example, suppose selling mislabelled drugs is
a strict liability offense. Itfollowsfrom the logic of the Model Penal Code that one who sells properly
labelled drugs has committed attempted sale of mislabelled drugs. It was his purpose to engage in
the conduct (selling the drugs) that would have been an offense if the strict liability ele-
ment (mislabelling) had been present, and he had the mental state required by that ele-
ment (none). Moreover, if he took a substantial step towards selling the properly labelled
drug with the purpose of selling it, he would be guilty of an incomplete attempt. See Ken-
neth W. Simons, Mistake and Impossibility, Law and Fact, and Culpability: A Speculative Essay,
81 J. CruM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 447, 480-81 n.109 (1990).
Because this implication of § 5.01 is outrageous and obviously unintended, one should
read an objective core into what is otherwise a completely subjective account of attempts.
If a strict liability element (mislabelling)-or a negligence element (unjustifiable risk)-is
not present, then one can attempt to commit the crimes that include these elements only if
one has as his purpose-hopes-that they are present, believes them to be present, or
believes there is a substantial and unjustifiable risk that they are present (i.e., an inculpa-
tory mistake at the level of recklessness or above).
There is a similar argument that recklessness under the Model Code, which is other-
wise a subjective matter, requires that the substantial and unjustifiable risk actually exist, so
that one who believes himself to be driving at an unsafe speed cannot be reckless if his
actual speed is a safe speed. Instead, he would be guilty of "attempted recklessness." See
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (c) (1985). But seeAlexander, supra note 34, at 17-20 (criticiz-
ing the notion of objective risk).
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proach it adopts for attempts for other forms of inchoate criminality,




The case law on this issue is sparse and conflicting. In the federal
courts, the leading case is United States v. Feola s 7 in which the Supreme
Court upheld a federal conspiracy conviction despite the defendant's
lack of knowledge regarding a jurisdictional issue (the victim's status
as a federal officer). The Court emphasized the dangerousness and
blameworthiness of the conspiracy, though their connection to the
jurisdictional issue was left opaque.
In Feola the Court distinguished United States v. Crimmins,3 8 a Sec-
ond Circuit case in which Judge Learned Hand overturned a convic-
tion for conspiracy to transport stolen securities in interstate
commerce. The defendant did not know the source of the securities
and thus was unaware of their connection to interstate commerce, the
touchstone of federal jurisdiction. Although such absence of knowl-
edge would have been immaterial had the offense been completed,
Judge Hand regarded it as quite material to the conspiracy charge,
arguing by analogy that one cannot be guilty of conspiracy to run a
traffic light that one does not know exists. Oddly, only one year
before, in United States v. Mack,39 Judge Hand had upheld a conviction
for conspiracy to violate a law requiring notification of the United
States government of a prostitute's status as an alien even though the
defendant was unaware that the prostitute in question was an alien.
The state conspiracy cases, though rare, seem to align with Crim-
mins rather than Feola. In a New York case, People v. Powell,40 a convic-
tion for conspiracy to violate a malum prohibition criminal law of which
defendant was ignorant was struck down. The court argued that de-
fendant's ignorance meant that he lacked the requisite "corrupt mo-
tive" for the conspiracy conviction. And courts in both Pennsylvania
and Massachusetts followed the reasoning in Powell in similar cases. 41
Outside the conspiracy area, the case law on the relation between
36 With respect to conspiracy, solicitation, and complicity, MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.06,
5.02, and 5.03 self-consciously leave the issue in question to the courts to resolve. See
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 commentary at 311 n.37 (1985); § 5.02 commentary at 371
n.23; § 5.03 commentary at 408-14.
37 420 U.S. 671 (1975).
38 123 F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1941).
39 112 F.2d 290 (2d Cir. 1940).
40 63 N.Y. 88 (1875).
41 See Commonwealth v. Benesch, 194 N.E. 905 (Mass. 1905); Commonwealth v. Gor-
mley, 77 Pa. Super. 298 (1921).
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inchoate crimes and strict liability offenses or elements is almost com-
pletely nonexistent. One English case, Gardner v. Akenroyd,42 rejected
attempt liability in the context of a strict liability crime. Another Eng-
lish case, Johnson v. Youden,43 took the same approach to a charge of
complicity in a strict liability offense.
c. Scholarly Commentary
The few scholars who have addressed the issue of the requisite
mens rea for inchoate criminal liability with respect to the target
crime's strict liability elements have disagreed with one another.
Robinson and Grall endorse importing the level of mens rea with re-
spect to circumstances required for the target offense into the incho-
ate offense.44 Under that approach, D, would have committed
inchoate crimes in all of our examples. Model Penal Code drafters
Wechsler, Jones, and Kom endorse the Code's delegation of the mat-
ter to the courts (except with respect to attempts).45 Smith also en-
dorses the Model Penal Code's approach to the issue in the context of
attempts. 46
On the other hand, there are commentators who are leery of au-
tomatically transporting strict liability elements in target offenses into
the counterpart inchoate crimes. LaFave and Scott oppose such a
move, although they do so primarily because they oppose strict liabil-
ity.47 Enker, however, opposes the move-at least in the context of
attempts-on a different basis.48 Enker agrees that when a crime is
completed, strict liability (or negligence liability) for various elements
may serve a deterrent function. On the other hand, when the crime is
inchoate, neither strict liability nor negligence liability is necessary for
either general or specific deterrence. Enker gives an example of a
man about to drive a car that, unbeknownst to him, has defective
brakes. Enker asks what would be accomplished by prosecuting the
driver rather than warning him. Indeed, Enker would even make the
strict liability element of knowledge inapplicable (at that level of
42 1952 II. Q.B. 743.
43 1950 I. KlB. 544.
44 Paul H. Robinson & Jane A. Grall, Element Analysis in Defining Criminal Liability: The
Model Penal Code and Beyond, 35 STAN. L. Ray. 681, 74043 (1983).
45 Herbert Wechsler et al., The Treatment of Inchoate Crimes in the Model Penal Code of the
American Law Institute: Attempt, Solicitation, and Conspiracy: Part Two, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 957,
971-77 (1961).
4 6 J.C. Smith, Two Problems in Criminal Attempts Reexamined, 1962 CRIM. L. Rav. 135, 143;
J.C. Smith, Two Problems in Criminal Attempts, 70 HARv. L. REv. 422, 435 (1957).
47 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAv 431 (1972).




"mens rea") to inchoate crimes. In essence, Enker proposes making
recklessness the minimum level of culpability for all elements of in-
choate crimes.
4 9
Finally, Fletcher argues that D1's false beliefs in our examples
should be exculpatory-even though they would not be so were the
crimes completed-if those false beliefs are causally relevant to DI's
conduct.50 In other words, if D1 would not assault V if he knew V was a
federal officer, have sex with Lolita if he knew her age, or drive the car
if he knew its registration had expired, then DI should not be deemed
guilty of the inchoate offense.
d. Summary of the Analysis
It is clear that neither the case law nor the scholarly literature
unequivocally resolves the issue of D1's liability in our examples. How-
ever, we believe that both Enker and Fletcher provide useful insights.
Moreover, the criticisms of their asymmetrical positions (as between
target and inchoate offenses) gain much of their force by focusing on
attempts, which are not necessarily inchoate crimes.
We shall return to the basic insight underlying the Enker and
Fletcher positions after we have examined negligence in inchoate
crimes.51 We can preview their relevance, however, as well as how Sec-
tions II and III of this article are related, by noting that the sting of
Enker's objection to symmetry-why arrest rather than warn?-and
Fletcher's-why arrest if, upon discovering the facts, defendant would
not be motivated to commit the crime?-points to the significance of
conditional purposes. If Di's purpose is internally (subjectively) con-
ditional on the noncriminality of his conduct-that is, if his purpose is
to assault V only if V is not a federal officer, to have sex with Lolita
only if she is over eighteen, and to drive the car only if its registration
is current-and he intends the conduct that is the actus reus of the
completed crimes only because his factual minor premises are mis-
taken, then, if he is made aware of his factual mistakes, he will desist
from carrying out the completed crime.
Now critics may object to this defense of asymmetry between in-
choate and completed crimes regarding mens rea and argue that, as
we have described D1's internally conditional purposes, D1 would not
be guilty of the inchoate crimes because he lacks the purpose to com-
mit them. Recall that Model Penal Code § 2.02 (6) states that a condi-
49 See Simons, supra note 35, at 514-15 n.205 (criticizing Enker for the asymmetry be-
tween attempted and completed crimes that Enker endorses).
50 George P. Fletcher, Constructing a Theoy of Impossible Attempts, 5 ClM. JusT. ETHICS 53
(1986).
51 See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
1162 [Vol. 87
MENS REA & INCHOATE CRIMES
tional purpose does not count as the statutorily required "purpose" if
the condition negatives the criminality of the conduct, which in each
of our examples it does. Therefore, the objection might go, we have
given examples, not of unjustifiable inchoate crimes, but of conduct
that current law would regard as noncriminal.
We doubt that the objection is sound, because we doubt that it
represents the standard interpretation of when conditions negate the
criminality of purpose. Di's purpose can be characterized on both an
abstract and a concrete level. On the abstract level, the purpose is "to
do C [the actus reus], unless X [a criminalizing condition] obtains."
On the concrete level, given D 1's belief that X does not obtain, his
purpose is merely "to do C." Therefore, D, has both an abstract inter-
nally conditional purpose and a concrete internally unconditional
purpose. And we see no evidence in the case law or in the Model
Penal Code that the courts are or should be interested in D1's abstract
purpose rather than his concrete purpose.
In any event, whether we are right or wrong in our reply to this
objection-and we would be delighted were the objection well taken
and the state of the law more in accord with what we recommend-
there is no reason to treat the defendant with an abstract internally
conditional purpose differently from the defendant whose criminal
purpose is internally unconditional but externally conditional. In
other words, there is no reason why D1 should fare better if he actually
thinks to himself, "I would not assault V were he a federal officer,
which he is not," or "I would not have sex with Lolita if she were
under eighteen, which she is not," than if he does not subjectively
entertain the possibility of his contemplated conduct's criminality but
would desist were he made aware of that fact. And there is absolutely
no indication that the cases and commentators who endorse the Feola
symmetry approach to the mens rea of inchoate crimes would be at all
hesitant to convict the latter defendant. (None of the cases or com-
mentators even hint at the relevance of a counterfactual inquiry re-
garding external conditions, except, of course, for proponents of
asymmetry like Enker and Fletcher).
B. THE ELEMENT IN QUESTION IS A CIRCUMSTANCE AND REQUIRES A
MENS REA OF NEGLIGENCE FOR THE COMPLETED CRIME
Let us take the three crimes in the previous section-assaulting a
federal officer, statutory rape, and driving a car with an expired regis-
tration-and assume now that the crimes require that defendant be
negligent with respect to whether the victim is a federal officer, the
girl is under eighteen, and the registration has expired. (Again, we
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shall assume that negligence liability is unproblematic for the com-
pleted crime).52 For defendant to be negligent with respect to these
elements, he must fail to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable
risk that the element exists when he should be aware of it.
53
Apparently, no court or commentator has realized in the discus-
sion of mens rea requirements for inchoate crimes that negligence
cannot be straightforwardly transported from completed to inchoate
crimes. That is because with respect to inchoate crimes, we must ask
not what risks of the material elements obtaining the defendant was
taking at the time of the completed crime, but what unjustifiable risks
he is presently thinking of taking at the contemplated future time of
his target crime, and whether those present risks of future risks are
unreasonable. And there is no body of law or commentary that is
helpful in addressing that inquiry.
Consider that I have a present purpose to drive from my house to
my office in fifteen minutes. I might subjectively entertain the
thought that I will carry out this plan only if traffic and weather condi-
tions permit, but, alternatively, I might not think about these poten-
tially purpose-defeating conditions at all. Suppose the latter, and
suppose further that the road conditions at the time I plan to leave for
the office are such that I would have to drive criminally negligently to
get to my office in fifteen minutes. If I commit the actus reus of an
inchoate form of negligent driving, for example by taking a substan-
tial step toward getting in my car or by agreeing with another that I
will drive to the office in fifteen minutes, have I committed "at-
tempted negligent driving" or "conspiracy to drive negligently"? Or,
put differently, can I be negligent now for planning to do something
that will be negligent when done? Can I be so even if there is no
reason to believe I will not alter my conduct if and when I see that
carrying out my plan will be unjustifiably risky?
The problem of symmetry between completed and inchoate
crimes with respect to elements that require negligence is even more
serious than the previous paragraph suggests. In theory, if D1 takes an
unreasonable risk that V is a federal officer, Lolita is under eighteen,
and the car is unregistered, and commits what otherwise would be the
completed crime, then ifV turns out not to be a federal officer, Lolita
turns out to be eighteen, and the car turns out to be registered, D1 is
52 But see Larry Alexander, Reconsidering the Relationship Among Voluntary Acts, Strict Liabil-
ity, and Negligence in Criminal Law, 7 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 84, 98-101 (1990). Recklessness,
because it rests on a culpable choice, is completely unproblematic as a basis for criminal
liability. See Alexander, supra note 34, at 3-7.
53 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (d) (1985).
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guilty of the completed attempt of the target crimes.54 This is true de-
spite the fact that the objective risk that V would be a federal officer,
Lolita would be underage, or the car would be unregistered was
zero. 55 Now suppose we move D1 back in time to the point at which
he commits the putative inchoate crime, intending at that point to
engage in the future conduct that would constitute the completed at-
tempt. Given that the objective risk of the elements obtaining is zero,
but also that at the time of the completed attempt D1 could act "negli-
gently" with respect to those elements, how do we characterize his ear-
lier conduct? Whatever problems exist with respect to criminalizing
inadvertence to risk at the time of the completed crime pale in com-
parison to criminalizing the purpose to engage in future conduct that
may be risky when it is performed. Although we might be able to
construct a notion of what constitutes a reasonable advertence to risk
of future inadvertence to risks, the whole idea of anticipatory negli-
gence-i.e., failing to advert to a risk that one will in the future fail to
advert to a risk (that may objectively be zero) -is deeply problematic.
C. A NOTE ON SOLICITATION AND CONSPIRACY
The conceptual and normative problems regarding strict liability
and negligence liability in inchoate crimes are exacerbated when the
crime the defendant is trying to bring about is to be committed by
another. When D1 solicits, encourages, or aids D2 in assaulting V, se-
ducing Lolita, or driving the unregistered car, and the statuses of V,
Lolita, and the car are matters of strict liability or negligence, what
does the law prescribe for D1?
Three possible scenarios exist. First, D2 has committed (or has
completed an attempt to commit) the target crimes. Second, D2 has
not yet acted, but he is beyond the influence of D1. Third, D2 has not
54 Even the subjectively oriented Model Penal Code does not criminalize these exam-
ples as completed attempts. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 (1) (a) (1985). Nonetheless, the
general logic of attempts would dictate that characterization. See, e.g., Simons, supra note
35. For if we switch the examples and focus on a case where the central conduct, and not
just a circumstance, is negligent, the case becomes cloudier under the Model Penal Code.
For example, if driving 90 miles per hour is "criminally negligent driving," and, because I
have not repaired my speedometer, I purposely take an unreasonable risk that I am driving
90, then even if I am in fact not driving 90, I have arguably committed "attempted negli-
gent driving." And the logic of that example extends to the examples in the text. See also
Simons, supra note 35, at 479-83. Finally, there is no difficulty in saying that one can run a
negligent risk of X even though the objective risk of X is zero (because X does not in fact
exist). The only difficulty is specifying the perspective from which the negligent risk-
greater than zero and less than one-is calculated, given that the defendant in a true
negligence case is not adverting to the risk. But this is a problem with negligence gener-
ally. See Alexander, supra note 52, at 98-101.
55 Objective risks are either one, if the fact in question obtains, or zero, if it does not.
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acted, and D1 still has the ability to withdraw his encouragement and
aid.
In the third scenario, DI's relation to the target crimes is on a par
with his involvement in cases where he has conspired or made a sub-
stantial step attempt. Therefore, the analysis of this scenario should
track the analysis of the prior two sections.
What about the first and second scenarios? The Model Penal
Code leaves their resolution to the courts.56 Case law is almost nonex-
istent.57 What is clear is that there are strong reasons in favor of asym-
metry between the target crime and its solicitation/complicity.
The strongest case for symmetry occurs when there is close tem-
poral and spatial proximity between the point of Dj's involvement and
the point of D2's commission of the crime. Close proximity will in-
crease the chance that the situation will appear to the solicitor/ac-
complice much as it appears to the principal. Put differently, the
situation will appear to D, much as it would appear to him were he,
not D2, the principal. For example, it is easier to grasp the idea that
DI is negligent in not adverting to the risk that the principal will un-
reasonably not advert to or be appropriately persuaded by the risk of
some element if there is temporal and spatial propinquity between the
two times of inadvertence.
Even if D, is very close to standing in D2's shoes temporally and
spatially, there may be other respects in which his being a separate
person should defeat a claim that D, shares in D2's negligence. Most
importantly, D1 may lack D2's knowledge base. For example, if D1 en-
courages D2 to drive D2's unregistered car, only D2 and not D1 would
likely be considered negligent with respect to the car's being unregis-
tered, especially if D1 had no knowledge of or responsibility for the
car's registration status. (This ignorance would not, of course, excul-
pate D, if the registration were a matter of strict liability.)
There will be other scenarios where DI is removed in time and
space from the target crime. If D1 urges D2 to seduce Lolita, can D1 be
"negligent" for failing to advert both to the risk that Lolita is underage
and the risk that D2 will not advert to that risk (or will consciously
ignore it)?
IV. THE LINKAGE BETWEEN CONDITIONAL CRIMINAL PURPOSE AND
MENS REA AS TO CIRCUMSTANCES
The problems we have discussed in Sections II and Ill--the prob-
lem of conditional purpose and the problem of mens rea as to circum-
56 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
57 SeeJOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 30.05(3) (1987).
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stances-while capable of being separately analyzed and resolved, are
linked. The latter problem arises because the core criminal purpose
that serves as the touchstone of inchoate criminal liability can be con-
ditional, both internally and externally, in ways that make completion
of the crime uncertain. A person may intend to drive a car only on
the internal-i.e., subjectively held-condition that its registration is
current. Or he may intend to do so without that internal condition,
but with an external condition to the effect that he will not in fact do
so if he were to become aware that the registration is not current. If
prior to the time at which he intends to drive he mistakenly believes
the car's registration is current, the discussion in Section III asks
whether he has committed an inchoate version of the crime of driving
an unregistered car if the currency of the registration is a matter of
strict liability (or negligence).
Significantly, the question of Section III only arises because the
purpose in an inchoate crime is always conditional internally and ex-
ternally in ways that make uncertain whether the actus reus of the com-
pleted crime will occur. The driver arrested at T1 for the inchoate
crime of, say, attempting to drive an unregistered car, or conspiracy to
drive an unregistered car, at T2 may have noticed the expired registra-
tion and chosen not to drive. The driver arrested at T1 for attempting
or conspiring to drive negligently because he (unconditionally) in-
tended to drive to a specific destination in fifteen minutes, at T2 may
have noticed the terrible road conditions and chosen to change his
estimated time of arrival. If purposes regarding future conduct were
unconditional, we could merely ask whether the conduct presently in-
tended will likely be negligent or violate a strict liability norm at the
time it is supposed to occur. Because we would have interdicted de-
fendant's course of conduct prior to the consummation of his pur-
pose, we would have to speculate about what its factual circumstances
would have been had it not been interdicted. But we would not have
to speculate about how defendant's purpose would have been affected
by the passage of time and his acquisition of information. His pur-
pose would remain fixed.
Thus, when our defendant intends to drive from point A to point
B, no matter what, we need only predict the road conditions, the traf-
fic, and other factors to determine whether in so intending he is at-
tempting negligent driving. Because the defendant's purpose is fixed,
at this inchoate stage we need not worry about whether the defendant
would have had a change of heart. Our analysis does, however, re-
quire predictions about how the world would be at the time the de-
fendant planned to drive.
Once we drop the assumption of an unconditional criminal pur-
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pose in favor of the realistic view that even internally unconditional
purposes are almost always externally conditional in a variety of ways,
then interdiction at the inchoate stage of criminality makes it quite
uncertain not only whether a completed crime would have occurred
without our interdiction, but also what the nature of that crime would
have been. Indeed, our travelling defendant, in the face of poor road
conditions, might have: (1) decided to take more time (and would
have been guilty of no crime at all); (2) decided that getting to point
B was more important than the lives he was risking (and then would
have been reckless); or (3) remained unreasonably unaware that driv-
ing from A to B in fifteen minutes presented an unjustified risk (and
then would have been negligent).58
Strict liability and negligence depend much more on how the
world is and less on what defendant believes and desires than do the
higher levels of mens rea. The liability of our driver with a fixed and
unconditional purpose depends entirely on how the world happens to
be at the time he drives. Adding the internal and external conditions
that accompany all purposes make the line between inchoate crimes
and completed crimes that have negligent or strict liability elements
anything but a straight one.
V. PROPOSED REFORMS
A. THE GENERAL CASE FOR INCHOATE CRIMES
Despite the conditionality of his criminal purpose, the defendant
who commits a true inchoate crime, such as an incomplete attempt or
conspiracy, usually has shown himself to have a less than totally admi-
rable character and to pose some threat to the rights of others pro-
tected by the criminal law. Ordinarily, however, neither a wicked
character nor the danger it represents suffices for criminal liability.
What distinguishes the inchoate criminal from others who are wicked
and dangerous is that the former has formed a criminal intention and
taken some steps toward accomplishing his intended result.
B. THE ELIMINATION OF INCOMPLETE ATTEMPTS
We contend that those steps that, under the Model Penal Code,
suffice for the actus reus of (incomplete) attempt-those that are a
58 Note that the presence or absence of a conditional purpose, be it internal or exter-
nal, will never actually be a factor for the eventually negligent actor because it is his lack of
awareness and failure to trigger the condition that makes him negligent. This is not to
accept the inchoate form of negligent driving, however, because prior to his driving we
cannot tell whether the driver will become aware of circumstances that will trigger an inter-
nal or external condition and cause him to alter his plans.
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substantial step toward completion of the crime and strongly corrobo-
rate the criminal purpose-cannot be said to be inherently danger-
ous. That is, although those steps remove obstacles to completion of
the crime and in that sense make the crime more likely, they are not
acts that singly or jointly increase the risks to others in the absence of
criminal intentions and in that sense are not dangerous in themselves.
If the actus reus of an incomplete attempt is not itself dangerous,
then defendant's committing the actus reus cannot be considered a
culpable act. The reason is that for an act to be culpable, the act must
appear to defendant to increase risks to others in a way that is not
dependent on defendant's further choices. In other words, defendant
cannot view his own future choices as matters subject to his predic-
tion. Indeed, so long as defendant views himself as having control
over any future choices to create risks that will then be beyond his
control, it is doubtftul that even he, much less the law, can clearly dis-
tinguish in terms of risks already present between what he intends on the
one hand and his mere wishes or fantasies on the other. Thus, even
though an incomplete attempt requires an act as well as purpose, the
act required is not a culpable act because, from defendant's point of
view, the act does not increase others' risks. It does not increase
others' risks because, from defendant's point of view, those risks can-
not materialize without a further choice or choices by defendant, a
matter over which he believes himself to have total control.59
Perhaps, however, we should focus not on the acts that manifest
the criminal purpose but on the act of intending the future crime. Are
intentions themselves acts-and thus potentially culpable acts-or are
intentions merely the states of mind that accompany other acts?
59 See Alexander, supra note 34, at 29 n.93. Preparatory acts do increase the risk to the
intended victims in this sense: defendant cannot, or believes he cannot, carry out his in-
tended crimes without performing them. They also increase the risk that others will com-
mit the crime, at least in some cases. In that sense, there is a distinction between the
inchoate crimes of incomplete attempts on the one hand and conspiracy, solicitation, and
complicity on the other. See infra Part V.C. Also, some preparatory acts increase the risk
that defendant himself will bring about the harm (even if not technically committing the
crime) through accident, insanity, or some other form of nonresponsible conduct. For
example, pointing a gun at someone for the purpose of killing him may count as a culpa-
ble act of reckless endangerment because of the chance of accidental discharge.
It is important also not to mistake our claim about culpable acts to be a claim that
those who commit culpable acts are more wicked-i.e., have a more debased character-
than those who commit only the preparatory acts required for inchoate criminality. Many
who do not commit culpable acts at all are more wicked than many who do, just as many
who never form a criminal purpose are more wicked than many who do. We are neither
attempting to conform the criminal law to the contours of the class of those with wicked
characters, nor are we attempting to banish the influence of luck on criminal liability. See
John Greco, A Second Paradox Concerning Responsibility and Luck, 26 METAPHmLosoPHy 81
(1995); Alexander, supra note 34, at 24-25.
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There are, of course, many kinds of mental acts that are performed
intentionally. Mathematical calculations, silent prayers, and attempts
to remember fall into this category. Are intentions about future con-
duct like this, so that they can be criticized, not just for the traits of
character they reveal-as would an involuntary flash of anger at see-
ing one's spouse acting flirtatiously around others-but as culpable
acts themselves? Are intentions themselves subject to voluntary con-
trol in the way that acting on intentions is subject to voluntary
control?
To us, the most coherent justification both for inchoate criminal
liability and for having a criminal purpose-whether internally or ex-
ternally conditional-as a requirement for such liability is not (as we
have said) wickedness or dangerousness, but rather rests on the as-
sumption that forming an intention to engage in future criminal conduct is
itself a culpable act, and sufficiently culpable to justify invoking the ma-
chinery of the criminal law. This assumption in turn rests on two fur-
ther assumptions.
First, the assumption presumes that forming an intention alters
the world in some way that is material to the criminal law's concerns.
That assumption is surely met, at least under many standard philo-
sophical accounts of intentions. Under those accounts, intentions al-
ter the balance of reasons for the actor. Before he forms the
intention, he has reasons A, B, and C in support of doing the act and
reasons X, Y, and Z against doing it. After he forms the intention, he
has a new reason for doing the act, namely, the intention itself, a rea-
son that makes the act more likely.
60
Second, the assumption presumes not only that forming inten-
tions changes the world in the way indicated, but that forming inten-
tions is something we do intentionally. If this assumption is granted, then
we can say that forming a culpable intention-an intention to commit
a future culpable act-is itself a culpable act.
Again, the argument we are considering here is not that it is the
intention, itself, that is the culpable act, but rather the formation of
the intention. 61 To illustrate, suppose a person has a certain belief/
60 See MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, INTENTIONS, PLANS, AND PRACrIc REASON 80 (1987); Jo-
SEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASONS AND NoRMs 65-71 (1975). For a somewhat different view that
holds decisions to act to be actions, but not reason altering actions, see THOMAS PINK, THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF FREEDOM 125-28, 137-65 (1996).
61 See BPRATMAN, supra note 60, at 103 (implicitly acknowledging that forming an inten-
tion is an action while discussing the Toxin Puzzle, in which a Genie offers you a million
dollars if and when you form the intention to drink a very unpleasant but harmless potion
after you have received the money: " [T] he million-dollar reason is a reason for a present
action of causingyourself so to intend; this reason is relevant to deliberation about whether
so to act now, not to whether to drink the toxin later") (emphasis added). For a different
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desire set. Ordinarily, this person will form an intention to act based
on his evaluation of his beliefs and desires and a decision regarding
what is the best course of action to take in light of them.62 Based on
this decision, the actor forms an intention, a plan to engage in that
course of action.
Thus, John hates his wife. He desires that she die. He believes
that if he kills her, he will not be caught. He weighs these beliefs and
desires against other beliefs, such as the belief that murdering is
wrong or that he used to love his wife, and the desires these beliefs
summon, and decides today to kill her on Saturday. Through this pro-
cess John comes to intend today to kill his wife on Saturday. Accord-
ing to Bratman,John's theory of heuristics will determine whether it is
rational forJohn to reconsider his intention.63 It may not be rational
or necessary for John to reconsider his intention come Saturday: He
will simply act on it.
Hence, while intending, by itself, is not an act but rather a mental
state,64 the mental act of deciding what to intend is potentially a cul-
pable act. Moreover, the triggering of this decision need not be an
intentional action itself. Otherwise the objection would be that of re-
gress: one must intend to intend, will to will, decide to decide. 65
However, our everyday lives present us with many situations where we
make choices without deciding that we should first think about choos-
ing. Thus, a belief, a thought, or desire, none of which is controllable,
might trigger the deliberations. Nevertheless, the actor does have
control over his deliberations and knows right from wrong at the
point at which he decides what he plans to do. IfJohn is confronted
with his wife sleeping with his best friend, he might suddenly think
that he wants to kill her, but he still controls whatever decision he
might take in light of that desire.
Even if the formation of the intention is an action, it does not
necessarily follow that it is a culpable action that unleashes a risk of
harm to the potential victim. On the one hand, if it is not necessarily
rational to reconsider one's intention, the decision to do wrong may
be the point at which the balance of reasons has shifted for the actor,
and he has committed the culpable-unreasonably dangerous-act.
view of the Toxin Puzzle, see PINK, supra note 60, at 137-65.
62 See MICHAEL S. MOORE, ACT AND CrumE 140 (1993) (noting that "[i]n the face of
conflict between prima facie desires, there seems to be a resolution when the actor decides
which of the alternative courses of action he is going to pursue").
63 BRATMAN, supra note 60, at 64 ("nonreflective (non) reconsideration of a prior inten-
tion is the upshot of relevant general habits and propensities").
64 Cf MOORE, supra note 62, at 116, 119-20 (arguing that a volition, a kind of intention,
is a mental state).
65 See, e.g., id. at 115 (discussing GILBERT RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND 67 (1949)).
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The formation of the intention might then be analogous to the light-
ing of a long fuse where, while the actor may still exert control over
whether the harm does materialize, the risk to the victim has nonethe-
less increased.
A rejoinder to this argument for treating formation of a criminal
intention as a culpable act is that when one is planning to commit a
crime, it may always be rational to reconsider.66 An even better rejoin-
der may be that many intentions are formed with the proviso that
there can always be later reconsideration. Moreover, unlike a lit fuse,
which the actor may find himself unable to put out, the actor knows
that he is still in control of his actions.67 While intentions may serve to
guide our futures and to keep us from being Sartrean persons,68 they
are not irreversible nor may they be carried out without any further
effort on our part. The risk may have increased but the actor still
remains in control of whether this risk will be unleashed. Forming an
intention is not like being in a trance with the actor unable to recon-
sider. Rather, we always know that our intentions may be changed up
to the point of acting on them. Indeed, intentions are formed with
the knowledge that we can renounce. Thus, intentions are guides to
future actions that do not prevent our later reconsideration. It follows
that an actor has committed a culpable act only at the point where the
actor has truly relinquished control, not at the point where he forms
the intention.
Another related point decisively supports our argument against
making incomplete attempts crimes. Gerald Dworkin and David Blu-
menfeld make this point in Punishment for Intentions,69-namely, that
the lines between intending, on the one hand, and fantasying, wish-
ing, desiring, and wanting, on the other, even if philosophically clear,
are quite difficult to draw as a practical matter, even for the actor
himself. As Dworkin and Blumenfeld point out:
This... objection has two aspects, the difficulty of the authorities distin-
guishing between fantasying, wishing, etc. and even more importantly
the difficulties the individual would have in identifying the nature of his
66 Cf BRATMAN, supra note 60, at 67 ("[1]t seems plausible to suppose that it is in the
long-run interests of an agent occasionally to reconsider what he is up to, given such op-
portunities for reflection and given the stakes are high, as long as the resources used in the
process of reconsideration are themselves modest").
67 The defendant who lights the fuse surrenders control of the risk he poses to his
victim. If, for some reason, he is incapacitated, the harm will occur. However, if the actor
with a culpable intention is incapacitated, he simply will not unleash the risk of harming
his victim.
68 See MooRE, supra note 62, at 141 ("Recognizably human people are non-Sartrean;
they regard their decisions, resolutions, choices, etc. as fixing matters that do not again
need recalculation") (footnote omitted); see also BRATmAN, supra note 60, at 111.
69 Dworkin & Blumenfeld, supra note 17, at 401.
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emotional and mental set. Would we not be constantly worried about
the nature of our mental life? Am I only wishing my mother-in-law were
dead? Perhaps I have gone further. The resultant guilt would tend to
impoverish and stultify the emotional life.
70
This objection, of course, has no purpose when we are dealing with
completed crimes and completed attempts. Nor does it apply to cases
where one solicits or encourages another to commit a crime, which we
shall argue should count as recklessness toward the victim even in the
absence of purpose if the criteria for recklessness are otherwise pres-
ent.71 It does apply forcefully, however, to incomplete attempts,
where it is the actor's attitude toward his own future conduct that is at
issue.
Thus, we have shown that all purposes with respect to future acts
are conditional, if not internally, then surely externally. We have
shown that the Model Penal Code's approach to conditional purpose,
which treats all conditions, unless they render the purpose non-crimi-
nal, as immaterial, no matter how unlikely they make the crime, is the
only approach that is coherent and that avoids drawing morally arbi-
trary lines. We have shown that although the Model Penal Code's ap-
proach to conditional purpose is the most defensible approach, it
leads to counter-intuitive results in many cases. We have concluded
that the source of the problem is not the Model Penal Code's treat-
ment of conditional purpose, but the Model Penal Code's endorse-
ment of treating a defendant's harmless acts as inchoate versions of
later harmful acts that he will later possibly commit. We have rejected
the idea that an act is culpable simply because one has taken an other-
wise harmless step toward a crime that one (always conditionally) has
the purpose of committing. And we have rejected the more plausible
idea that forming a criminal intention is itself a culpable act.
We are left then with the notion that the defendant who commits
a substantial step-that is, an incomplete-attempt, although cer-
tainly a person with a wicked character and quite likely a person who
is dangerous, is not a person who has as yet committed a culpable act
and is thus not a fit subject for criminal liability.72 We would there-
70 Id.
71 See infra Part V.C.
72 We leave open the possibility, of course, for preemptive action against such a defend-
ant, premised either on self-defense, defense of property, defense of others, or on the
established mechanisms for official preventive detention. Put differently, until the defend-
ant completes an attempt, he is not a criminal, but at a certain point he will be subject to
various preemptive defensive responses.
For some interesting ruminations on preemptive action against the dangerous, see
Randy E. Barnett, GettingEven: Restitution, Preventive Detention, and the Tort/Crime Distinction,
76 B.U. L. REv. 157 (1996); Stephen J. Morse, Blame and Danger: An Essay on Preventive
Detention, 76 B.U. L. Ry. 113 (1996).
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fore change § 5.01 of the Model Penal Code-the attempt section-to
eliminate incomplete attempts (§§ 5.01 (1) (c) and 5.01 (2)) and refer-
ences thereto.
73
C. MAKING RECKLESSNESS THE REQUISITE MENTAL STATE
FOR SOLICITATION
The actus reus of solicitation is conduct that encourages another
to commit a crime. The actus reus of conspiracy is an agreement to
commit a crime. In both crimes, the actus reus itself, without regard
to defendant's mens rea, increases the likelihood that a crime will be
attempted.
To illustrate this point, imagine Carrie who wishes to kill Lauren.
Rather than go at it alone, she asks Brian if he will help her. At this
73 There is a reference to § 5.01 (1) (c) in § 5.01(4), the renunciation subsection. We
would also reword that subsection to make clear that renunciation is available only in cases
when, although the attempt is complete, the harm is still within the actor's control (the
long lit fuse cases).
The attempt section as we would reform it would read as follows:
SECrION 5.01. CRIMINAL ATTEMPT
(1) Definition of Attempt. A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting
with the kind of culpability otherwise required for commission of the crime, he:
(a) purposely engages in conduct which would constitute the crime if the attend-
ant circumstances were as he believes them to be; or
(b) when causing a particular result is an element of the crime, does or omits to
do anything with the purpose of causing or with the belief that it will cause
such result without further conduct on his part; or.
(c) purposely does or omits to do anything which, under the circumstances as he
belives them to be, is an act or omission constituting a substantial step in a
course of conduct planned to culminate in his comission of the crime.
(2) Conduct Which May Be Held Substantial Step Under Subsection (1)(c). [Eliminated.]
(3) Conduct Designed to Aid Another in Commission of a Crime. A person who engages in
conduct designed to aid another to commit a crime which would establish his
complicity under Section 2.06 if the crime were committed by such other person,
is guilty of an attempt to commit the crime, although the crime is not committed
or attempted by such other person. [But see infra notes 79-82 and accompanying
text].
(4) Renunciation of Criminal Purpose. When the actor's conduct would otherwise con-
stitute an attempt under Subsection (1) (b) or (1) (c) of this Section but the achieve-
ment of the particular result can still be prevented by the actor, it is an affirmative defense
that he abandoned his effort to commit the crime or otherwise prevented its com-
mission, under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation
of his criminal purpose. The establishment of such defense does not, however,
affect the liability of an accomplice who did not join in such abandonment or
prevention.
Within the meaning of this Article, renunciation of criminal purpose is not volun-
tary if it is motivated, in whole or in part, by circumstances, not present or apparent at
the inception of the actor's course of conduct, which increase the probability of detec-
tion or apprehension or which make more difficult the accomplishment of the crimi-
nal purpose. Renunciation is not complete if it is motivated by a decision to postpone
the criminal conduct until a more advantageous time or to transfer the criminal effort
to another but similar objective or victim. [But see Appendix A infra. If our suggestion
there for treating renunciation as the absence of a criminal omission is accepted, the
motives behind renunciation become immaterial.]
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point, solicitation has occurred. Also, note that Carrie has unleashed
a risk of harm on Lauren since Brian may decide that killing Lauren is
a great idea even without Carrie's help. Thus, even if Carrie backs out
now, the risk of harm to Lauren has increased.
Now assume that Brian agrees. We have a conspiracy. If Carrie
changes her mind now, she has still unleashed the risk that Brian will
complete the crime without her assistance. Indeed, the rationale for
punishing conspiracy, and'sometimes punishing both it and its object
crime, is the increased risk created by group criminality.
In solicitation and conspiracy, then, we have crimes in which de-
fendant's conduct is dangerous apart from his mental state. That
point in turn suggests that we rethink the mens rea requirements for
these crimes. Although the Model Penal Code requires a purpose
that the crime be committed as the mens rea for both solicitation and
conspiracy,74 this requirement makes no sense where the danger
stems from the encouragement of others to commit the crime. Reck-
lessness should suffice as the mens rea for solicitation. Recklessness,
with its notion of conscious disregard of unjustified (and substantial)
risk, takes into consideration all legitimate reasons one might have for
conduct that one realizes might be taken by someone else as encour-
agement to commit a crime when the conduct's purpose is not such
an encouragement.75
Consider, for example, Iago, who continually gives Othello hints
pointing to Desdemona's infidelity. If Iago's purpose is that Othello
kill Desdemona, we have a garden variety case of solicitation, except
that it is complicated by the question of whether solicitations must be
transparent to the solicitee-whether he must realize he is being solic-
ited-or whether they can be opaque, as is Iago's. Suppose, instead,
that lago's purpose is not that Othello kill but only that Othello be
tortured by unjustified jealousy and rage. Is there any reason to let
Iago off the hook if he is aware that there is a substantial risk that
Othello will kill? We think not.
Although an actor is not culpable for forming a criminal inten-
tion or for taking an otherwise harmless step toward realizing that in-
74 See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 5.02(1), 5.03(1) (1985).
75 Indeed, we would make recklessness rather than purpose the mens rea for complicity
generally, which solves a major problem with the Model Penal Code's requirement of pur-
pose. Furthermore, acts that would count as complicity were a crime committed would
count as reckless endangerment rather than attempt, at least if substantial step attempts
were eliminated. See id. § 5.01(3) (1985) (making all acts sufficient to establish complicity
into attempts even if the crime aided or encouraged is not committed or attempted by the
other person).
On the role of the substantiality of risk component of recklessness, see infraAppendix
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tention, he is culpable for encouraging others to commit criminal
acts, even if his purpose is innocent, at least if he is reckless regarding
the likelihood that they will commit those acts.76 We would therefore
reform § 5.02(1) to reflect this shift from purpose to recklessness as
the premise of criminal liability.
77
Additionally, recklessness should be required as the lowest mens
rea for all elements of inchoate crimes regardless of the mens rea re-
quired in the completed crime. Effecting this reform does not re-
quire redrafting of the Model Penal Code beyond that required by the
prior reforms. Dropping incomplete attempts takes attempts out of
the category of inchoate crimes altogether. For completed attempts,
the mens rea with respect to each element should be exactly the same
as the mens rea required for the completed crime. Thus, if shooting a
peace officer is an aggravated version of shooting a person, and if the
status of the victim as a peace officer is a matter of strict liability where
the attempt is successful, that element should also be a matter of strict
liability if the attempt is unsuccessful (i.e., the bullet misses).78
76 We should note the issue of whether free speech is threatened by reducing the mens
rea for criminal solicitation from purpose to recklessness. Currently, garden-variety crimi-
nal solicitation is arguably subject to the requirement of Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,
447 (1969), that the soliciting speech be directed to inciting and likely to incite the audi-
ence to imminent lawless acts (although the likelihood component seems absent in those
many cases that involve solicitation of informants or undercover police). We doubt that
the directed-to-inciting component of the Brandenburg test makes recklessness with respect
to inciting an unconstitutional basis for criminal liability because the justification compo-
nent of recklessness takes into account any First Amendment values and concerns. If Fred
has been told that uttering "the red fish swims at dawn" will trigger a homicidal rampage by
a maniac, and the phrase has no significance (as opposed to semantic meaning) for Fred,
if Fred then utters the phrase-say, because he just likes its sound-he should be subject to
criminal punishment, the First Amendment notwithstanding, even though inciting the
homicidal rampage is not Fred's purpose.
On the general issue of criminalizing acts that increase the probability of others' crim-
inal offenses, see Andrew von Hirsch, Extending the Harm Principle: "Remote" Harms and Fair
Imputation, in HARM AND CULPABILITY 259-76 (A.P. Simester & A.T.H. Smith eds., 1996).
On the relevance of this issue to freedom of speech law, see Larry Alexander, Incitement and
Free Speech (forthcoming) (on file with author).
77 Section 5.02 provides as follows:
SECTION 5.02. CRIMINAL SOLICITATION
(1) Definition of Solicitation. A person is guilty of solicitation to commit a crime if with
the culpability otherwise required for its commission, with recklessness regarding the pur-
pose of promoting or facilitating its commission he commands, encourages or
requests another person to engage in specific conduct which would constitute
such crime or an attempt to commit such crime or which would establish his
complicity in its commission or attempted commission.
It should be noted that the conditions explicitly placed on the request to commit the
crime are material only as they affect defendant's belief in the likelihood that the crime
will occur. Defendant's purpose in making the request is material only as it affects defend-
ant's justification for doing so.
78 We actually would prefer making recklessness the basis for attempt liability in all
cases in which recklessness would suffice for the completed crime. Thus, we would prefer
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Finally, aiding or attempting to aid should be treated as a form of
criminal recklessness. The attempt section of the Model Penal Code,
§ 5.01(3), deems as an attempt conduct designed to aid another in
the commission of a crime and that would make one an accomplice
were that crime actually committed or attempted.79 We see no reason
to distinguish the treatment of such conduct from the treatment we
have urged for solicitation.80 Indeed, we would deem all present aid-
to redraft § 5.01(1) (a) and § 5.01 (1) (b) as follows:
SECrION 5.01. CRIMINAL ATTEMPT
(1) Definition of Attempt. A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting
with the kind of culpability otherwise required for commission of the crime, he:
(a) purposely or, where recklessness regarding conduct is sufficient for liability for the
completed crime, recklessly engages in conduct which would constitute the crime
if the attendant circumstances were as he believes them to be; or
(b) when causing a particular result is an element of the crime, does or omits to
do anything with the purpose of causing or, with the belief that it will cause,
or, where recklessness regarding the result is sufficient for liability for the completed
crime, with the belief in the substantial and unjustifiable likelihood that it will cause
such result without further conduct on his part; or
(c) purposely does or omits to do anything which, under the circumstances as he
believes them to be, is an act or omission constituting a substantial step in a
course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime.
Nonetheless, we have not presented the case for this-namely, that results should
never matter for criminal liability-in this article. But see Alexander, supra note 34;
Kimberly D. Kessler, The Role of Luck in the Criminal Law, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 2183 (1994).
We wholeheartedly embrace the very implications of subjectivism that Duff believes should
constitute a reductio of that position. See R.A. Duff, Subjectivism, Objectivism and Attempts, in
HARM AND CULPABILI[Y 19-44 (A.P. Simester & A.T.H. Smith eds., 1996). Duff correctly
notes that subjectivism should entail distinguishing complete and incomplete attempts,
which is, of course, what we are advocating. See id. at 30.
For some further thoughts on the relation of recklessness to attempts, see infraAppen-
dix B.
79 For the text of § 5.01 (3), see supra note 73.
80 In fact, the Model Penal Code recognizes the tight connection between liability for
solicitation under § 5.02(1) and liability for attempt under § 5.01(3) in two ways. First,
solicitations are one way a defendant becomes an accomplice under § 2.06(3) (a) (i) ("A
person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense if: (a) with the
purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense, he (i) solicits such
other person to commit it... ."). Second, the punishment for soliciting a crime and the
unishment for attempting it are the same under the Code. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.05(1)
1985). Because we believe that recklessness (as well as higher forms of culpability) should
be punished the same whether or not it eventuates in actual harm, see e.g., Alexander, supra
note 34, at 7-17, we would categorize as completed crimes all those acts that make one
responsible for the conduct of another under Model Penal Code § 2.06. Further, the pun-
ishment for these completed crimes would not depend upon whether the crime was ever
carried out or attempted by the principal, so long as the actor acted recklessly with respect
to the principal criminal's attempt, at least where recklessness suffices for the completed
crime.
Note that making harm completely immaterial to criminal liability also eliminates any
argument against making recklessness itself entirely subjective. Currently, it is unclear
whether the substantial risk of which the actor must be conscious to be reckless must actu-
ally exist (be "objective"). See supra note 35. For example, is one reckless when he believes
he is driving at 100 miles per hour, an unsafe speed, but he is actually driving 50 (a safe
speed)? Or is he only attempting to be reckless? We believe it should make no difference.
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ing or attempting to aid another's future crime as encouragement of
that crime, a form of solicitation for which recklessness should suffice,
as a mens rea.81 If solicitation is thus broadened to include aid and
attempts to aid, § 5.01(3) could be entirely eliminated.8 2
We should also note that the reforms we propose answer the
problematic question of what specific crime the actor is deemed to
have encouraged if purpose is not the required mens rea. The answer
is that he is liable for encouraging the specific conduct he is con-
sciously aware of substantially risking. In other words, we ask what
conduct did he specifically contemplate, either as his conscious object
(purpose) or as certain (knowledge) or highly likely (reckless) to
occur.
D. THE ELIMINATION OF CONSPIRACY LIABILITY
Finally, we advocate the elimination of conspiracy liability. As dis-
cussed below, the culpable acts for which we want to punish conspira-
tors fall within our expansive definition of solicitation. Moreover,
some defendants who are currently deemed conspirators have not
committed any culpable acts and thus should not be punished.
In examining conspiracy liability, it is helpful to deal with three
separate situations. Let us first deal with the situation where A and B
agree that A will commit the crime. For example, A approaches B
with the idea of robbing a bank. B says, "Wow, that sounds fantastic.
Here, borrow my gun. I'll help you plan which bank to rob."
In examining the relative culpability of the parties, B's encour-
agement and aid have increased the risk of harm to the bank, and
therefore B has committed a culpable act.8 3 As for A's culpability, we
That is, recklessness and attempted recklessness-if that is what the hypothetical de-
scribes-should both be punishable, and to the same extent, whether they result in harm
or not. Completely subjectivizing recklessness as we prescribe also eliminates the philo-
sophically troubling notion of regarding risks as objective rather than as merely reflections
of epistemic limitations. See Alexander, supra note 34, at 17-20. (In other words, because
all risks are either one or zero, the distinction between "subjective" and "objective" versions
of recklessness collapses).
81 We leave the more general issue of recklessness and complicity to future scholarly
treatment. For articles pointing in the direction we think correct, see Sanford H. Kadish,
Reckless Complicity, 87J. CiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 369 (1997); Daniel Yeager, Helping, Doing,
and the Grammar of Complicity, 15 CRIM. Jusr. ETHIcs 25 (1996).
82 If our suggestion that recklessness count as an attempt for all crimes in which it
suffices as the mens rea for the successful crime is adopted, see supra note 78 and accompa-
nying text, solicitation and attempt could also be punished the same, as the Model Penal
Code currently prescribes.
83 Note that we are employing throughout this article a particular conception of what
makes an act a culpable act. A culpable act is one that the actor believes increases the risk
of harm to another's protected interests and for which the actor's reasons for acting do not
justify his imposing that risk. See Alexander, supra note 34, at 3-5. Whether the actor is
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may view him as having increased the risk of harm in one of two ways.
First, we may view A's agreement to commit the crime as a culpable
act. If conspiracy is to be a crime separate from solicitation and cog-
nate crimes that are premised upon encouraging others, it must be
because A, in agreeing with others that he will commit the crime, has
increased the risk of his own criminality. Agreeing would be the cul-
pable act that unjustifiably increases the danger to the victims of the
contemplated crimes.
Note that if defendant's agreement to commit a crime himself,
and not (solely) his encouragement of others, is the basis of his con-
spiracy liability, his purpose should be immaterial. A defendant can
agree in a way that commits him without having intended to carry out
the agreement. Mental reservations do not relieve the defendant of
or negate his commitment if they are unexpressed. Conscious aware-
ness that one is objectively "agreeing" suffices as the requisite mental
state for declaring one morally and legally bound.
84
Requisite mental state aside, however, we are inclined to reject
the argument that agreements to commit crimes are culpable acts by
those who are to commit the crimes. Put differently, we deny that
when A agrees with B that A will commit a crime, A, by virtue of his
agreement with B, has acted recklessly by increasing the danger to A's
intended victim. A's commitment to illegality is both morally and le-
gally85 renounceable. Nor has A's balance of reasons been shifted in
favor of committing the crime. If A can be presumed to know the law,
he can be presumed to know that his "commitment" is illusory.
The second basis for finding that A has committed a culpable act
arises when A's conscious object is to involve B in his scheme by con-
vincing B to help him commit the crime. That is, A is purposefully
involving another party. Even if there is only a slight chance that B
will agree to help him, in seeking B's help A is purposefully risking
harm in the same way that one can set a bomb that has only a minute
chance of going off. How does A's involvement of B necessarily in-
crease the risk of harm where A, and not B, is going to commit the
crime? A may have increased the risk because by giving B the idea, B
may commit the crime without A. The question of whether A should
be responsible for such an action collapses into the question of
acting with the purpose to cause the harm goes to his reasons for acting and suggests a
much greater likelihood that the act is culpable than if the actor's purpose is not itself
proscribed.
84 See, e.g., JOHN D. GALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAWv OF CONTRACTS § 2-2
(1987).
85 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03(6) (1985) (providing that renunciation of criminal
purpose is an affirmative defense to conspiracy).
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whether he should be liable for solicitation: whether if, by giving B
the idea, A unjustifiably and substantially increased the risk of harm,
and if so, whether A should be held criminally responsible.
In this situation, we have two actors who are potentially being
held responsible for their encouragement of the other to commit the
crime. However, the expansive definition that we have adopted for
solicitation provides the justification for punishing both of these de-
fendants.86 There is no need for a separate crime of conspiracy.
Now let us look at the case where A and B agree that they both will
commit the crime. If A approaches B with the result that A and B
decide to rob a bank together, both have committed culpable acts. B
is giving aid and encouragement to A for his plan, and A has given the
idea, as well as aid and encouragement, to B. Once again, the risk
increase is attributable to acts of A and B that are within our defini-
tion of solicitation.
Finally, we should consider what happens when A and B agree
that B will commit the crime. Here, let us assume that A approaches B
and asks B to kill A's wife, C. B agrees.
Once again, A increases the risk to C by giving B an idea that he
might act on even without A. But what has B done? Assume B is a
hired hit man who works for the Mafia. A, an old family friend, asks
B to kill A's wife even though "domestic disputes" are not part of B's
business. B agrees. Later, the mob tells B that they need him, and B
tells A to find someone else. When, if ever, has the risk to C been
increased as a result of B's actions? The answer is that B's acceptance
of the job did not increase the risk to C. Indeed, if anything, until B
carries out the plan or renounces it, B's acceptance decreases C's risk by
making it less likely that A will kill C himself or find someone else to
kill C.
Thus, the approached actor-the person who is not the one with
the initial idea but is the only one who will carry out the crime-does
not increase the risk of harm to anyone. So long as we believe that his
mere agreement does not increase the risk of his committing the
crime, B, by agreeing with A, has not increased the risk of harm. B
has not committed a culpable act.
We must note the narrowness of this category, however. The ac-
tor must be the only person planning to commit the actus reus of the
underlying crime. Moreover, his involvement must be limited to his
agreement to act; he cannot be encouraging or facilitating the ap-
proacher in any way. Thus, if the hit man had said, "Call my friend
Bob, he'll do it for you since I can't," this exception would not apply
86 See supra note 77.
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to him. As soon as the actor is generating ideas that the approacher
.ould later use with someone else, he is increasing the risk that the
crime will be committed and falls within the ambit of our reckless
solicitation.
8 7
Thus, there is an asymmetry in conspiracies. The approached ac-
tor never increases the risk, whereas the approaching actor only in-
creases the risk by recklessly inducing-soliciting-his co-conspirator
to commit the crime. We therefore would eliminate the crime of con-
spiracy altogether in favor of a sufficiently capacious notion of
solicitation.
E. RECKLESSNESS, ELIMINATION OF INCHOATE CRIMES, AND MENS REA
AS TO CIRCUMSTANCES
Our proposals amount to eliminating inchoate crimes and then
covering much of their territory with recklessness liability. In substi-
tuting recklessness liability for purpose-based inchoate crimes, we not
only avoid the conditional purpose conundra of Section II, but we
also solve the puzzles regarding mens rea as to circumstances adum-
brated in Section III.
For example, suppose killing by strangulation is a higher degree
of murder than killing by sword. lago "solicits" Othello to kill Desde-
mona by hinting at her infidelity. Whether lago is guilty of soliciting
the higher degree of homicide or the lower will turn on the specific
risks of which he is consciously aware. Only if he is reckless regarding
every element of a crime-in the case of the higher degree of homi-
cide, the element of killing by strangulation-can he be guilty of solic-
iting that crime. Recklessness is the universal solvent for
circumstantial mens rea.
VI. CONCLUSION
We hope we have demonstrated, first, that the puzzles of condi-
tional purpose stem at bottom from the criminal law's choice to deem
forming a criminal purpose to be a culpable act subject to criminal
punishment. Because all purposes regarding future acts are condi-
tional, once the law criminalizes such purposes, it has no way to draw
lines and avoid counter-intuitive results. The second point we hope to
have demonstrated is that the controversy over the collateral mens rea
for inchoate crimes-a controversy that the Model Penal Code does
not even attempt to resolve-stems from the same decision to
criminalize acting with the purpose to bring about a future crime.
87 How substantially must he increase the risk to be deemed criminally reckless? See
infra Appendix B.
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We believe that decision is erroneous. Once we reject the idea
that acting with a purpose or forming a purpose to commit a future
crime is itself a culpable act-and thus reject the notion of incom-
plete attempts as culpable acts subject to criminal sanction-and we
premise criminal liability for aiding and soliciting others to commit
crimes on recklessness regarding others' criminal acts, we can resolve
both problems at once. The mens rea issues surrounding inchoate
criminal liability at bottom reflect inadequate notions of what is-and
what is not-culpable action prior to the commission of completed
crimes.
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APPENDIX A: RENUNCIATION
Buried in our proposed reforms is the question of renunciation
of attempts.a8  The typical incomplete attempter of homicide who
buys the gun may change his mind later, and the criminal law as it
now stands would call this renunciation. We, however, would not
even place incomplete attempts within the bounds of the criminal law.
Without incomplete attempts, is there anything left to the renuncia-
tion defense?89 Consider the following three cases;
1. Albert ties up Veronica and places dynamite under her. He
then lights the ten foot fuse.
2. Betty gives Vera poison which increases the probability of
death by ten percent each minute. Betty has the antidote to
the poison and can save Vera by giving it to her as late as nine
minutes, fifty-nine seconds after Vera drinks the poison.
3. Carla is a world famous surgeon. She shoots Victor, knowing
that she can easily remove the bullet, but that if she does not,
Victor will die.
Under the current regime, Albert is capable of renouncing.
Carla's performing surgery and Betty's administering the antidote
would render their crimes attempted murders instead of murders.
However, because we endorse the view that Darla, who shoots at
Victor and misses, is as culpable and deserving of punishment as Ed-
ward, who shoots and kills, how can Carla and Betty be deemed to
have successfully renounced? Are Carla and Betty less guilty of an at-
tempt than Darla? And if Carla and Betty cannot renounce, why can
Albert?
If we view completed attempts as those in which the actor has
unleashed a risk over which he no longer has complete control, all
three actors have committed completed attempts. If Albert, Betty,
and Carla were to be hit by lightning, all three harms would material-
ize without any further action by them. Yet we do feel the intuitive
pull that Albert, at the very least, should be able to renounce his
crime.
Additionally, it is doubtful that there is any real difference among
these three cases. Carla may have unleashed a greater risk of harm
than Betty, and Betty's risk may be greater than Albert's, but all three
88 In our proposed revision of the attempt section of the Model Penal Code, we left the
renunciation section essentially intact. See supra note 73.
89 We should note that renunciation as a defense to completed attempts is more prob-
lematic for us than for some theorists because we both endorse the view that materializa-
tion of harm is irrelevant, both to the defendant's culpability and his punishability. See
Alexander, supra note 34; Kessler, supra note 78.
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actions could eventually result in death, and all three actors have pur-
posefully unleashed this risk of death. However, all three actors may
still prevent the death. What should we do with Albert, Betty, and
Carla?
Consider these crimes to have two parts: the act and the ability to
act again to stop the harm. In analyzing the crimes this way, we could
posit omission liability for Albert, Betty, and Carla if they do not stop
the harm. If an actor shoots and does not have the ability to remove
the bullet, under the current law, we do not require him to try. But in
cases such as Albert's, Betty's, and Carla's, where the actors do have
the ability to stop the harm, we could punish them more severely if
they do not. Does this omission approach really work? Are we willing
to say that if Carla opts to let her victim die, she is guilty of a two-fold
murder? (If so, of what is Carla guilty if she saves Victor? Presumably,
Carla is guilty of attempt, which we would punish the same as murder,
but not murder by omission.) Is every murder like Carla's really a two-
fold murder-both a killing and a failing to prevent dying? Clearly
this does not correspond to our general view of such homicides.90
Another approach might be a finding of reckless action when the
actor renounces the crime. Thus, Albert, when he lights the fuse, is
reckless as to his ability to prevent the harm. Even if Albert stomps
out the fuse, he is guilty of reckless endangerment, and his reckless-
ness would increase with each foot of the fuse he allows to burn. The
same approach would work with Betty. Perhaps we could even say that
Carla was only reckless if she removed the bullet.
This approach is problematic, to be sure. If we retain the distinc-
tion between purposeful and reckless crimes, Albert, Betty, and Carla
would all receive less punishment than actors who committed the
same crimes-lighting the fuse, giving the poison, and shooting and
mortally wounding-but were caught before they had the chance to
renounce. They would also receive less punishment than those who
try to light the fuse but find that the lighter does not work, try to give
poison but find that the victim drops the food in which it is contained,
and try to hit the victim but shoot and miss. Yet, when Albert, Betty,
and Carla acted, they all engaged in purposeful attempts. They were
not merely reckless as to the harm they might cause their victims; they
wanted those harms to materialize. They were just more or less reck-
less as to their ability to prevent the harms should they have a change
of heart.91
90 This approach also changes our general view about renunciation: rather than offer-
ing the renunciation defense as a carrot, we are using the failure to renounce as a stick.
91 There are cases where the defendant's renunciation shows that he lacked a fixed
purpose to commit the crime. In those cases (where purpose does not actually exist), the
1184 [Vol. 87
MENS REA & INCHOATE CRIMES
Still another approach is to deny them the defense of renuncia-
tion altogether. We could take the position that having committed
the last act, these actors may not be permitted to renounce. Given
our elimination of incomplete attempts, there would no longer be
room for renunciation in the criminal law; there would be only regret.
If an actor actually kills his victim, his regret does not factor into our
determination that he is a murderer. Our three actors-Albert, Betty,
and Carla-purposefully unleashed risks. Perhaps the harms will ma-
terialize, perhaps they will not; but all three actors have shown them-
selves to be extremely culpable and worthy of punishment.
But, do we not want them to be able to renounce? These three
people still have the ability to stop the harm, and we surely want to
encourage them to do so. They may be culpable for having unleashed
these risks of harm, but they still have the ability to save three lives.
Should we not encourage them to do so by mitigating their punish-
ments when they prevent harm?
Accepting this argument would not be accepting a consequential-
ist view of punishment. Rather, we could believe that all three are
extremely culpable but that our concern for innocent life is more im-
portant than punishing them fully. After all, the criminal law does not
singlemindedly pursue the goal of matching punishment to culpabil-
ity, but allows that goal to be compromised by all sorts of other poli-
cies. So we could punish completed attempts less severely if the
defendants stop the harm from materializing.
A problem with this solution is the one that arises with the reck-
lessness approach: the shooter, Darla, who misses, gets punished to
the full extent of the law, but Carla, who shoots and hits but removes
the bullet, does not. How can this be justified? Both were equally
culpable at the time they fired the bullets, but one gets a lesser pun-
ishment (and indeed, of the two, the one who actually hits the
victim!).
One way to retain the benefits of renunciation is this: renuncia-
tion should play a role only at the sentencing stage. Albert, Betty, and
Carla are all attempted murderers and deserve to be punished as
such. Indeed, they all deserve to be punished the same as successful
murderers. However, subsequent to their culpable actions, they have
rendered aid that is relevant to the punishment that they should re-
ceive. This is consistent with the practice of reducing the sentence of
those who render substantial assistance to the authorities. Just as luck
would have it that some criminals have knowledge of other crimes that
figures into the reduction of their sentences, some actors will have the
recklessness approach should be used.
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ability to prevent the harm, and doing so will figure into their
sentence.
Moreover, because ajudge might justifiably take into account the
regret of a defendant whose victim did die, taking into account the
abandonment of a crime does not lead to inconsistent results; any de-
fendant who shows remorse or regret, whether he fails to produce the
harm (misses), succeeds in producing the harm (murders), or stops
the materialization of the harm, is eligible for a reduction in sentence.
In determining criminal liability, however, as opposed to sentencing,
we cannot treat those who renounce as noncriminal, because they did
purposefully (or, in other cases, knowingly or recklessly) unleash a
risk of harm. Nor can we treat those who happen to be able to stop
the harm differently from those who do not.
In the end, the approach we (very tentatively) favor is the first
one we described, namely, treating these situations as involving more
than one potentially criminal act. Albert, Betty, and Carla commit a
crime when they light the fuse, administer the poison, and fire the
shot.9 2 If they then find themselves in position to remove or reduce a
risk that they created, but do not remove or reduce the risk, they are
guilty of a second criminal act by omission.93 Thus, Carla, who shoots
and wounds and then fails to prevent Victor's death, is guilty of two
crimes, unlike Edward, who shoots and kills instantaneously, but like
Felicia, who shoots and misses and then shoots again (whether or not
she hits the second time). Felicia is guilty of two attempts because she
fires twice. Because her second violation of a negative duty (not to
fire) is no different from Carla's violation of an affirmative duty (to
save Victor, whom she has placed at risk of dying), they should be
treated the same way. Likewise, Albert and Betty are guilty of two
crimes if they do not put out the fuse or give the antidote. True, Ed-
ward is guilty of only one crime because of the "luck" that his bullet
killed instantaneously. But then, such circumstantial luck-that
which presents or fails to present people with opportunities to make
culpable choices-is ineradicable. Felicia is guilty of two attempts for
92 Whether these crimes should be deemed purposeful attempts or only reckless-be-
cause even Carla knows there is a chance she will be in position to save Victor if her shot
does not kill him instantaneously and she has a change of heart-is an issue we take up
more fully in Appendix B, infra.
93 Omission liability is premised on having and violating an affirmative duty to act gen-
erated by placing the victim at risk. See DRESSLER, supra note 57, § 9.07(E) (1). The prob-
lem of how many omissions are involved with a continuously burning fuse, continuously
acting person, or continuously worsening gunshot wound victim is a thorny issue we leave
to others; however, it is no different from the issue of how many crimes are committed in a
continuing course of criminal conduct, such as kidnapping or removing money bill by bill
from a wallet.
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firing twice-as she should be-only because of the "luck" that her
first shot missed.
As we said, however, our favoring this solution to the renuncia-
tion problem is quite tentative. We invite others, if they are with us in
the abolition of incomplete attempts, to try their hand.
94
94 For a different approach to renunciation, one that connects it to whether defendant
was really trying to accomplish the illicit result, see Hoeber, supra note 12, at 394-96.
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APPENDIX B: INCOMPLETE ATTEMPTS AND RECKLESSNESS
By urging elimination of incomplete attempts, have we jumped
from a theoretical frying pan into a theoretical fire? Consider the fol-
lowing kind of case. Dan is driving towards Virginia's house, where he
intends to shoot and kill her. His loaded gun is on the front seat of
the car. While driving, Dan ponders the possibility that before he gets
to Virginia's house, there is the remote chance that either Virginia will
dart out into the path of his car and be killed, or that his gun will
accidentally discharge and kill Virginia. He estimates the probability
of Virginia's dying in those ways as one in a million. Although Dan's
plan is to kill Virginia in a different way, he would be just as pleased if
she were to die in either of those two types of accidents. The question
is: if Dan is not, while driving, guilty of an incomplete attempt-be-
cause we have abolished incomplete attempts-is he guilty instead of
(1) a completed attempt; (2) reckless endangerment; or (3) nothing
at all?
To assess these options we must recall the case of Cowardly
Jackal, who takes a one-in-a-million (by his estimate) shot at De Gaulle
from the Eiffel Tower.95 We said that were Jackal to hit and kill De
Gaulle, he would be guilty of purposeful homicide (because the kill-
ing of De Gaulle was his conscious object in firing). We also said that
if the bullet missed, Jackal would be guilty of a completed attempt (to
kill).
Either of two approaches can lead to the Jackal's being guilty of a
completed attempt. One is to continue to distinguish acting with the
conscious object (purpose) to kill from acting with conscious disre-
gard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death (recklessness re-
garding death). The Jackal is guilty of attempted homicide based on
his purpose for acting. He is not guilty of recklessness regarding
death because, although he was aware that he was creating an unjusti-
fiable risk, he was not aware that the risk was substantial.
96
The alternative approach leading to the Jackal's criminal liability
is to make recklessness the all-purpose mens rea, with purpose going
only to the justifiability of the risk. If recklessness retained the re-
quirement that the contemplated risk be substantial, we would end up
with the unacceptable anomaly-because guilt should not turn on re-
sults-that the Jackal would be guilty of criminal homicide if he hit De
95 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
96 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (c) (1985) (defining recklessness as acting with con-
scious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk). The point in the text assumes, of
course, that the relevant risk in question is only the risk to De Gaulle. If De Gaulle is
surrounded by people, so that the risk of killing someone is substantial, the point in the
text does not apply.
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Gaulle but guilty of nothing if he missed. A further step would be to
eliminate the requirement for recklessness that the contemplated risk
be substantial and retain only the requirement that it be unjustifiable.
Thus, consciously taking a one in a million risk of killing another
might not be reckless where one's purpose for acting is legitimate but
would be reckless where one's reason for acting is to bring about
death.97
Let us now return to Dan and Virginia to consider these options
at the point in time when Dan is still driving toward Virginia's house.
First, has Dan completed an attempt on Virginia's life under the ap-
proach that distinguishes purposeful attempts from recklessness? Dan
has increased his assessed risk to Virginia to one in a million, just as
did the CowardlyJackal with respect to De Gaulle. Moreover, once he
drives by, that risk is based on factors outside of his control (Virginia's
darting out, the gun's discharging), just as was the risk for Cowardly
Jackal (the bullet hitting De Gaulle once it was fired). Thus, we might
deem Dan guilty of a completed attempt even at this otherwise prepar-
atory stage.
Of course, one difference between Dan's case and Cowardly
Jackal's case, which many will view as precluding completed attempt
liability for Dan, is that Dan's plan is not to kill Virginia by having her
dart out in traffic or having his gun accidentally discharge, but rather
is to kill her by shooting her himself, a much more certain means.
Cowardly Jackal, by contrast, planned only the one in a million shot.
Should this distinction make a difference? If it does, then we end
up with another potential anomaly. Consider David, who, like Dan,
wants Virginia dead. Unlike Dan, however, David does not plan to
shoot Virginia. Rather, he plans only to drive near her house with a
loaded gun in his car, hoping either that Virginia will accidentally dart
in front of his car or that his gun will accidentally discharge and kill
Virginia. David is identical to Cowardly Jackal. If Cowardly Jackal is
guilty of a completed attempt when he fires, David is guilty of a com-
pleted attempt when he drives. But if David is guilty, why should not
Dan also be guilty?
There is, however, one way to distinguish Cowardly Jackal and
David from Dan. Cowardly Jackal and David estimate the likelihood
of success of their respective actions to be one-in-a-million. Dan, on
the other hand, while he would be happy to see Virginia die from this
97 In suggesting eliminating the requirement that the risk be substantial we do not
mean to eliminate reliance on defendant's subjective estimate of the risk. That subjective
estimate is the risk that is assessed in terms of its justifiability (which is an objective legal
standard). Eliminating defendant's subjective estimate of the risk in favor of some notion
of objective risk would conflate recklessness with negligence.
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one in a million chance, intends to employ a much more certain
means, namely, shooting her. With respect to that means, Dan's at-
tempt is at present incomplete and noncriminal. If Dan knew he had
no chance of shooting Virginia, there is no reason to believe he would
drive near her house with a loaded gun. He is like someone who
plants a bomb in a building he believes is empty in order to collect
insurance on the building, but who knows there is a remote but
greater than zero chance that his archenemy will be in the building
and die from the bomb, which he hopes (but, of course, does not
believe) is the case. Even if he were to discover that his archenemy is
definitely not in the building, his bombing plan would be unaffected.
He surely seems different from Cowardly Jackal and hence from
David. But he is indistinguishable from Dan with respect to the re-
mote chance of killing. Neither the bomber nor Dan "intends" to kill
his enemy through bombing or driving a car respectively.98
How does Dan fare under a recklessness approach? First, if the
substantiality requirement is retained, Dan is not reckless. But if Dan
is not reckless, neither is David. That means that if David's one-in-a-
million chance plan succeeds, he is criminally liable, but if it fails, he
is not, an unacceptable result from our viewpoint (because it makes
criminal liability turn on the luck of success).
Therefore, David either must be guilty of nothing even if his plan
succeeds and Virginia is killed, or he must be guilty of recklessness
whether or not his plan succeeds. If he is guilty of nothing, then Cow-
ardlyJackal, his exact analogue, is guilty of nothing, even if he hits De
Gaulle. Because that cannot be the correct outcome, David must be
guilty of recklessness. But for David to be guilty of recklessness, the
substantiality of risk requirement must be eliminated, which would
also mean Dan is guilty of recklessness before he reaches Virginia's
house.
On balance, the option we prefer-again, quite tentatively-is
the one that distinguishes Dan and David. David is guilty of a com-
pleted attempt because he drives near Virginia's house for the pur-
pose of increasing her risk of dying by auto accident or accidental
discharge of a gun. Dan is not guilty of a completed attempt because
that is not his purpose, though such results would please him.
If one rejects this option, however, then one should either elimi-
nate the substantiality requirement for recklessness and make reck-
lessness the mens rea for all crimes or make everyone in these
scenarios who both hopes for a result and believes he has increased
98 See BRATMAN, supra note 60, at 143-52 (distinguishing "intending" a consequence
from desiring it).
[Vol. 871190
]MENS REA & INCHOATE CRIMES
the chances of that result, however slightly, guilty of a completed at-
tempt.99 In the latter case, the distinction between attempts and reck-
lessness would be retained and would turn on the presence or absence
of desire for the result; and both Dan and David, as well as Cowardly
Jackal and the building bomber, are guilty of completed attempts. If,
however, one eliminates the desire that anyone die from auto acci-
dent, accidentally discharging gun, fired gun, or bomb, no one is
criminally liable at all, even if someone does die.
Eliminating the requirement that the contemplated risk be sub-
stantial makes all our actors reckless and criminally liable regardless of
results. Desire for someone's death only enters into the justifiability
of the risk-taking, which would be the sole determinant of criminal
liability.100 A considerable increase in criminal liability would follow,
especially if one rejects, as we do, the materiality of results.1 1
Finally, one option that is clearly objectionable is to both make
recklessness the all-purpose criminal mens rea and retain the substan-
tiality of risk requirement. Doing so would make both Dan and David
free of criminal liability, even if Virginia in fact dies from the car or
accidental gunshot. But it would also free CowardlyJackal from crimi-
nal liability, even if he hits De Gaulle.
99 Cf. supra text accompanying notes 20-21 (discussing hope and regret as they bear on
the problem of conditional purpose).
100 Of course, the risk-taking to be assessed in terms of justifiability would be defend-
ant's subjective estimate of the risk. See supra note 87.
101 For example, if one accepts our recklessness approach to solicitation, elimination of




APPENDIX C: RECKLESSNESS, SOLICITATION, AND MERCHANTS
Using recklessness as the premise for solicitation does raise one
problem: what about merchants who are reckless as to the illegal use
of goods they sell in the ordinary course of business? Should we pun-
ish a convenience store clerk for selling condoms to a man who is with
a rather young-looking woman? Should we punish the liquor store
owner who sells champagne to a man for his daughter's high school
graduation?
How do we determine whether these merchants were reckless?
Do we balance their right to each individual sale against the danger
each sale presents (because the loss of any one sale versus the danger
it may present may always yield that it is reckless for the merchant to
sell the goods), or do we include their general right not to have to
police their businesses constantly (after all, it is one thing to ask a
merchant not to sell to minors and another to tell the merchant not
to sell to people who then might sell to minors). Moreover, even if we
are assured that recklessness and its concept of an "unjustifiable" risk
will protect these merchants, what do we do about the knowing
merchant, one who assesses the danger from the sale to be 100%?
We recommend a per se rule excluding these sales from liability.
Thus, an actor who sells goods or services in the regular course of his
trade shall not be deemed to have rendered aid or encouragement
that is sufficient for solicitation liability. This exception, however,
does not encompass those cases where the merchant has a "stake in
the venture," as defined by the common law, for example, where the
merchant requests and receives more compensation because he
knows he is aiding a crime, or where he provides aid or encourage-
ment in addition to providing the goods or services (as, for example,
would occur if defendant purchases a gun and the merchant provides
advice on how best to shoot the intended victim).
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APPENDIX D: THE SCOPE OF THE ELMINATION OF INCOMPLETE
ATTEMPTS
Our proposal to eliminate incomplete attempts might be only
mildly controversial were it confined to the law of attempts. However,
the cases cited to illustrate the problem of conditional purpose reveal
that many crimes are actually forms of incomplete attempts. 10 2 In-
deed, any crime requiring intent to engage in some future act or omis-
sion is a form of incomplete attempt. That category includes burglary
(entry of a building "with purpose to commit a crime therein"), 10 3
kidnapping (unlawful confinement for various future-act-oriented
purposes),104 theft (unlawful taking of property "with purpose to de-
prive ... [the owner] thereof'), 10 5 and various forms of aggravated
assault, such as assault with intent to rape or kill.10 6 These crimes are
really two crimes combined, one of which is an incomplete attempt.
Thus, burglary usually consists of a trespass plus an incomplete at-
tempt to commit another crime (such as theft). Even theft is a combi-
nation of a conversion plus a purpose-quite possibly internally
conditional' 07-to permanently deprive the owner of his property.
Therefore, the logic behind our proposal to eliminate incom-
plete attempts points us toward a quite radical overhaul of the crimi-
nal law, not just some mild tinkering with the section on inchoate
crimes. We see no way to escape that conclusion. Nor do we believe it
is a reductio ad absurdum.
102 See supra note 9. See alsoJeremy Horder, Crimes of Ulterior Intent in HARM AND CULPA-
BILrrY 153-72, 160-63 (A.P. Simester & A.T.H. Smith eds., 1996).
103 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1(1) (1985).
104 See, e.g., id. § 212.1 (1985).
105 See, e.g., id. § 223.2(1) (1985).
106 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 220 (West 1988).
107 For example, Dan might take Vickie's television set with the purpose of keeping it
only if its picture is sharper than his television set's picture.
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